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The Dynamic Effect of Information
Privacy Law
Ignacio N. Cofone*
ABSTRACT
Discussions of information privacy typically rely on the idea
that there is a tradeoff between privacy and availability of
information. But privacy, under some circumstances, can lead to
creation of more information. In this article, I identify such
circumstances by exploring the ex ante incentives created by
entitlements to personal data and evaluating the long-term
effects of privacy. In so doing, I introduce an economic
justification of information privacy law.
Under the standard law & economics account, as long as
property rights are defined and transaction costs are low, initial
right allocations should be irrelevant for social welfare. But
initial allocations matter when either of these two conditions is
absent. Allocations also matter for production of goods that do
not yet exist. Personal information has these characteristics.
While the costs of disseminating information are low, transaction
costs to transfer an entitlement over it are not. In addition,
availability of information requires disclosure—and thereby
imposes costs. This analysis challenges the traditional economic
objection to information privacy and provides a new justification
for privacy rules by casting them as entitlements over personal
information.
The approach I develop here provides a framework to identify
which types of information ought to be protected and how privacy
law should protect them. To do so, it analyzes the placement and
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optimal protection of personal information entitlements while
also examining the commonalities between information privacy
and intellectual property. At a more abstract level, it sheds light
on the desirability of a sectoral versus an omnibus information
privacy law.
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INTRODUCTION
While the Internet’s technological characteristics, to some
extent, offer privacy with no precedents,1 they also produce a loss
of privacy with no precedents. For example, our browsing
1. In social interactions people know our face, gender, general physical
characteristics, and can have a good guess at our weight and age. On the
Internet, on the other hand, we can access information that we would be
embarrassed to look for in a library, or shop for any item that we would not like
to be seen buying in a shopping mall. On the Internet, fellow shoppers do not
know our particular identity and potential members of our community do not
know which information we are accessing.
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patterns can be known by Internet service and content
providers, as well as third parties, with a wide array of
technological developments such as cookies and fingerprinting.
In addition, people anywhere in the world can learn personal
information about us with just a few searches.
In particular, two changes that affect the incentives in
privacy exchanges took place in the last decade. The first is big
data, which makes surveillance significantly easier for both
public and private parties.2 The second is the decentralization of
how the Internet’s content is generated. Both modifications
imply that technology changed the context in which privacyrelated interactions take place and, consequently, that the
desirable scope of privacy protection might have changed as well.
Regarding the first change, advancements in search
algorithms that reduce the cost of information retrieval
facilitated the accessibility of information. Their development
was paired with increasing storage capacities and a reduction in
storage costs that increase the durability of information.3 As a
result, information about people’s lives is increasingly recorded
and stored in an accessible way. This makes personal
information more vulnerable to third parties—both public and
private—and increases the repercussions of people’s actions.4
This vulnerability can reduce well-being by producing
discomfort, and can create chilling effects on behavior that

2. Julie Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1913–15
(2013); James Grimmelmann, Big Data’s Other Privacy Problem, in BIG DATA,
BIG CHALLENGES FOR EVIDENCE-BASED POLICY MAKING 211 (Kumar Jayasuria
& Kathryn Ritcheske eds., West Acad. 2015); see also Omer Tene & Jules
Polonetsky, Privacy In The Age Of Big Data: A Time For Big Decision, 64 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 63, 65 (2012) (“The harvesting of large data sets . . . rais[es]
concerns about profiling, discrimination, exclusion, and loss of control.”).
3. David S.H. Rosenthal et al., The Economics of Long-Term Digital
Storage, in MEMORY OF THE WORLD IN THE DIGITAL AGE: DIGITIZATION AND
PRESERVATION 513 (2012) (explaining that the cost of storing digital media has
dropped exponentially in the last thirty years); JONATHAN L. ZITTRAIN, THE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 186 (2008), http://
futureoftheInternet.org/download/
(“[N]early
all
formerly
transient
communication ends up permanently and accessibly stored in the hands of third
parties, and subject to comparatively weak statutory and constitutional
protections against surveillance.”).
4. See Paul Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1607, 1624–25 (1999) (discussing how third parties may access cookies
detailing another individual’s browsing habits).
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interfere with personal autonomy.5 Surveys, high-profile
litigation, and policy debates show the high levels of concern that
people have about their information privacy in this context.6
The second change is a modification in the process of
creating content. Technologies such as cloud computing and
social networking—reinforced by the globalization of
information flows—were decentralized. The Internet evolved
from a linear model with a strong separation between content
creators and content providers to a system characterized by
global collaboration—sometimes called peer-to-peer technology
or web 2.0.7 A paradigmatic example of this trend was the
appearance of Napster in the 1990s, which mass-marketed the
idea that users could get files directly from each other (peer-topeer).8 The same mechanism was adopted by countless websites,
such as YouTube, Wikipedia, and SSRN, and by the idea of blogs
and social networks. This mechanism of content creation, as will
be explained later,9 is linked with the incentives to generate
information.10
These changes made privacy law more prominent.11
Perhaps the best example of this trend is the European Union
(EU), where they motivated the EU data-protection
framework—perhaps the most prominent omnibus approach to
regulating privacy.12 Many consider the EU data-protection
5. Id. at 1661 (discussing the “autonomy trap” associated with digital
participation).
6. For a review of different surveys reaching this conclusion, see Jeff
Sovern, Opting in, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1053–55 (1999).
7. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 2.0, at 34 (2006).
8. This phenomenon has motivated commentaries assessing its effects in
copyright law, and evaluating modifications for it. See, e.g., Daniel Benoliel,
Copyright Distributive Injustice, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 45, 57–58 (2007);
Raymond Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster and the New
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 272–73 (2002); Niels
Schaumann, Copyright Infringement and Peer-to-Peer Technology, 28 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1001, 1040 (2002).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part II.
11. Alessandro Acquisti, Leslie John & George Loewenstein, What is
Privacy Worth?, 42 J. LEGAL STUD. 249, 250 (2013).
12. The central norms of the framework are the Council Directive 95/46,
art. 3, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 39 (EC), Council Directive 2002/58, art. 3, 2002 O.J.
(L 201) 37, 43 (EC), Council Directive 2009/136, art. 1, 2009 O.J. (L 337) 11, 21
(EC), and the Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union art. 49, 56, 114, Oct. 26, 2012, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 49 [hereinafter
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framework the leading paradigm in information privacy.13
Several of the considerations that follow find their best examples
in EU law.
Writings about privacy law often reflect the implicit idea
that there is a tradeoff between privacy and the amount of
information available to pursue other social goals, such as
research that will in turn lead to innovation.14 This tradeoff is
sometimes depicted as a choice between rights and efficiency,15
where we prioritize one or the other depending on our normative
views. Sometimes, this tradeoff is implicit, when a balance
between the right to privacy and the right to freedom of
expression or to access to information is proposed. The idea that
this tradeoff exists determines the extent to which normative
arguments recommend protection of privacy. I argue here that
such a tradeoff is inaccurate, and that realizing this can lead us
to better information privacy law (IPL).
To illustrate this, one must evaluate the incentives
generated by the creation of entitlements over personal
information. In a low transaction-cost scenario where property
TFEU]. The EC has based its competence to issue these directives on the single
market provision of TFEU article 114, referring also to articles 49 and 56 of the
treaty (free movement of goods and services provisions). In DocMorris and
Gambelli, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has accepted the use of article
114 TFEU as a basis of competence for regulating the Internet. See JOHN
DICKIE, PRODUCERS AND CONSUMERS IN EU E-COMMERCE LAW 23 (2005); see
also Case C-322/01, Deutscher Apothekerverband v. DocMorris, 2003 E.C.R. I–
14951; Case C-243/01, Gambelli, 2003 E.C.R. I–13033.
13. NEIL ROBINSON ET AL., REVIEW OF EU DATA PROTECTION DIRECTIVE,
REPORT FOR THE UK INFORMATION COMMISSIONER’S OFFICE 22 (2009)
(describing the Privacy Directive as a “reference model for good practice”); Paul
Schwartz, The EU-US Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1966, 1971 (2013) (“[T]he international debate about
information privacy has never been confined to human rights or data trade. It
has always been about both.”). More than thirty countries have followed this
model. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2012). This
is largely driven by the prohibition of companies in the EU from sending data
to companies in countries outside the union without guarantees that such data
will receive an equivalent protection as it would have in the EU. See sources
cited supra note 12.
14. See, e.g., AMITAI ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 150 (2008)
(discussing the privacy implications of computerized medical records); see also
WORLD ECON. FORUM, PERSONAL DATA: THE EMERGENCE OF A NEW ASSET
CLASS (2011).
15. Cf., e.g., C. Dennis Southard IV, Individual Privacy and Governmental
Efficiency: Technology’s Effect on the Government’s Ability to Gather, Store, and
Distribute Information, 9 COMPUTER L.J. 359 (1989). As a partial disagreement,
one should note that rights are important for most conceptions of efficiency.
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rights are clearly defined, the allocation of an entitlement should
not affect Kaldor-Hicks social welfare,16 since costless
bargaining will lead to its ex post allocation to its highest valuer.
However, there is a caveat to this principle for goods that are not
yet available in the market.
From this viewpoint, we can differentiate two categories for
the purposes of this article: undisclosed information about
oneself that is therefore unavailable for others to use, which I
will call personal data, and information about oneself that was
disclosed and is therefore available, which I will call personal
information.
I argue that the production caveat to the irrelevance of
allocation includes personal data because they do not have the
characteristics of a good until the data are disclosed and made
available for others to use. In those cases, the entitlement is
relevant to determine investment levels, and hence the quantity
of information that will be available in the future. To disclose
personal data and make it available to others (turning it into
information), people face expected costs that, if left
uncompensated, lead to worries and, in turn, a lower level of
disclosure.
The public good characteristics of information provide an
additional reason to be concerned with these investment levels.17
If personal information has non-internalized positive spillovers,
its underproduction effect will be exacerbated because the
producer will not capture the full benefits of production. Hence,
establishing data-protection rules is not simply defining
entitlements over available goods over which there could be a
dispute. Establishing data-protection rules is also defining
entitlements over goods that are not yet available, where
generating them implies expected costs for those who can
produce them.
For these reasons, some degree of information privacy
increases the amount of personal information available for
exchanges. It is incorrect that privacy reduces the scope of the
16. See generally J.R. Hicks, Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON.
J. 696 (1939); Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939).
17. See generally Roger A. McCain, Information as Property and as a Public
Good: Perspectives from the Economic Theory of Property Rights, 58 LIBR. Q. 265
(1988) (examining the public goods characteristics of information in the library
context).
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rights against which it is sometimes balanced, such as access to
information. What is more, it also increases them. The
normative question about information privacy then turns from
whether to grant privacy at all to protect access to information,
to how much privacy to grant to optimize access to information.
Either no protection at all or a maximum level of protection
would lead to a low amount of information available.
To address this normative question, I frame the protection
of information through privacy as a mechanism to allocate
entitlements over personal information, by virtue of which the
entitlement-holder has the right to decide who can access it and
who cannot (hence excluding others from accessing the
information).18 The establishment of entitlements is analytically
prior to deciding how to protect it—e.g. by property rules—
because one must determine whether an entitlement is in place
to evaluate which protection is most appropriate for it.19 In this
sense, property is narrower than entitlements. Based on this
consideration, I evaluate whether property rules, liability rules,
or inalienability rules are the best way to protect privacy
entitlements. Building on the economic considerations made, an
optimal protection mechanism will combine different types of
rules, and provide differing levels of exclusion (and sometimes
no exclusion at all) depending on the type of information
involved.
The approach I introduce here, in this way, addresses two
gaps in the privacy literature. The question of why privacy is
relevant is answered by seeing that transaction costs are not low
and, more importantly, the placement of its entitlement matters
for production. The question of how to introduce property
elements over personal information given differences in the
reasons to protect personal information and to protect
intellectual property is addressed by showing that both
copyright and IPL foster the generation of information.

18. This is a broad definition of entitlement, similar to the definition used
by Calabresi and Melamed, which only entails that the good (in this case
personal information) is owned by someone, and that such person has rights
over it. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules,
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1089
(1972) (“[E]ntitlements are protected by property, liability, or inalienability
rules . . . .”).
19. Id. at 1090.
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The next Part will review the traditional economic
perspective on privacy: that the optimal scope of privacy
protection is often no privacy at all. Part II will point to the
special characteristics of personal information in the context
described in this introduction: personal information is a public
good, has low transaction costs of communication, and is a good
that is not yet available (and often has high costs of production).
Part III will evaluate the production of personal information,
which is disclosed as a by-product of an activity and whose
protection increases its production levels. These characteristics
eliminate the central economic objection to privacy and thereby
justify the creation of privacy entitlements. Part IV will evaluate
the different ways of protecting these entitlements under a
Calabresi and Melamed framework, examining whether
property rules or liability rules are most appropriate. It will
conclude that a mixed protection system can best address
privacy issues. Part V will provide normative recommendations
to structure this mixed protection system: IPL has common
grounds with copyright, and it could be structured similarly to
it, but it must pay special attention to some technological
characteristics that are relevant in light of the considerations
made in Part II. Part VI will conclude.
I.

THE ECONOMICS OF PRIVACY

A. CONCEALMENT AND ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
A well-known article on privacy by information economist
Jack Hirshleifer began by stating that
a new territory has been discovered by economists, the intellectual
continent we call ‘privacy.’ The pioneers are our peerless leaders
Posner and Stigler whose golden findings have already dazzled the
world. . . . Our pioneering economists, like explorers in other places
and other times, found aborigines already inhabiting the territory—
in this case intellectual primitives, Supreme Court justices and such.
Quite properly, our explorers have brushed the natives aside.20

The curious thing about this quote is that, contrary to what
a hopeful reader might think, Hirshleifer was not sarcastic. The
first economic account of privacy, well described by Hirshleifer,
applies the Coase theorem to state that free exchange of data
will take it to the party that values it the most independently of

20. Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 649, 649 (1980).
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who originally owns it. For that reason, whether there is a right
to privacy is irrelevant because, in any case, market forces drive
information to its highest valuer.
Such account of privacy, in some way, is a more formal
version of the famous “I have nothing to hide” argument, and it
has become a widespread reason among legal economists to
disregard privacy claims.21 The term “privacy” is taken to mean
concealment of information—in particular, concealment of
information in an instrumental way.22 Seeing privacy as
concealment links it with the economics of information, where
one person wants to screen for a characteristic and another
would like to conceal it (for example, in the job market), thereby
impeding efficient allocations.23
According to this argument, privacy concerns are
instrumental: people assert privacy rights to hide data from
someone else to obtain something. There are individuals with
bad traits who want to hide them (privacy) and individuals with
good traits who want to show them. In this account, information
is only an intermediate good that has costs of protection and
discovery.24 Privacy would then create an information
asymmetry for those traits disadvantaging the buyers in the
market (for example, employers), thereby distributing wealth
and creating inefficiencies.25 In this way, privacy as concealment
21. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Legal Regulation of Genetic
Discrimination: Old Responses to New Technology, 74 B.U. L. REV 1, 12 (1994)
(describing privacy as “the right to misrepresent one’s self to the rest of the
world”).
22. Richard Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 405, 405
(1981) (“[P]rivacy as concealment of information seems the most interesting
from an economic standpoint.”); see Richard Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12
GA. L. REV. 393, 411 (1978) (describing the right to privacy as concealment of
information as an unattractive approach); Richard Posner, An Economic Theory
of Privacy, 2 REGULATION 19, 21 (1978) (discussing how information a person
seeks to conceal may have value to others); see also Richard Posner, Privacy, in
3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 103, 103–07
(Peter Newman ed., 1998).
23. Posner develops here the idea that privacy is a tool of concealment for
the devious, originally formulated by Arndt. See Heinz Arndt, The Cult of
Privacy, 21 AUSTL. Q. 68, 69 (1949) (“Most codes, whether they are embodied in
law or merely in moral rules and social taboos, serve to protect individuals and
society and against anti-social acts. The cult of privacy seems to serve the
opposite purpose.”).
24. See Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, supra note 22.
25. Id. For a different argument, stating that information about others is
necessarily incomplete, and a lack of privacy rule can lead to hasty judgments
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of data would reduce the information with which the market
allocates resources.26
This idea of privacy equates it to restricting knowledge.
Privacy reduces the amount of information available about
someone. People who want information protected by a privacy
statute will accordingly use other less precise (and usually less
intrusive but more costly) substitutes as a proxy for the data
they want to acquire. For example, if an employer cannot access
the work history of a potential employee, she will establish a
trial period in which she will monitor the new employee.27 A
similar principle can be applied to the Internet: if the same
employer cannot access criminal records, she will estimate the
likelihood that the employee has a criminal record based on the
information she has available.
The next step in the argument applies the Coase theorem.
With clearly defined property rights and low transaction costs,
goods will end up in the hands of those who value them the most,
independent of their initial allocation.28 Under these conditions,
the party that values a good the most can buy it from the other
if the initial allocation was granted to the latter.29 It is
sometimes argued along these lines that, if one applies this
argument to personal information, as long as transaction costs

about others that are often mistaken, see Daniel Solove, The Virtues of Knowing
Less: Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1039
(2003) (“[I]solated information, often constituting only part of a very
complicated reality, may lead to hasty condemnation.”). For the argument that
the Internet is prone to disseminating false rumors, see Cass Sunstein,
Believing False Rumors, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET 91 (Saul Levmore &
Martha Nussbaum eds., 2010).
26. Still, Posner argues that the privacy tort is efficient. The tort covers
four aspects: preventing the use of one’s picture and name without one’s consent
for advertising purposes, preventing facts about one being portrayed under a
“false light,” preventing people from obtaining information by intrusive means,
and preventing the publication of intimate facts about oneself. Posner argues
that the first three increase the flow of information and that the prevention of
publication of intimate facts is rarely enforced. See Posner, The Right of Privacy,
supra note 22.
27. Cf. George Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and
Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 632 (1980). In these contexts, not disclosing
information can sometimes also be informative for the other party: if people
with good traits can reveal them, but people without them cannot do so
fraudulently, then the lack of disclosure will be informative of the lack of good
traits.
28. Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 16 (1960).
29. Id.
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remain low, whether there is privacy (which allocates the right
over information to the person to whom that information refers)
or no privacy (which allocates information to whoever finds it) is
irrelevant for the information’s final allocation.30 Privacy law
would then have no welfare effect. For that reason, under this
no-transaction-cost condition, introducing disturbances in the
market such as welfare-decreasing information asymmetries
that generate the need for proxies would be unjustified.31
B. PRIVACY’S LACK OF ECONOMIC RATIONALE
The traditional literature on the economics of privacy seems
to indicate that there is little economic justification for a general
right to privacy. This reluctance to protect privacy, however, has
been the subject of two attacks: one arguing that it is based on
(and depends on) the overly narrow conception of privacy as
concealment,32 and one arguing that it ignores relevant
externalities in data trading.33
Regarding the conceptual critique, the concealment
approach, which considers privacy socially welfare-decreasing,
does not take into account that privacy can also have a noninstrumental value.34 Surveys have shown that people do not
believe that those concerned about their privacy try to hide
immoral or illegal behaviors,35 and this result is confirmed by
psychological literature on the topic.36 People have “pure”
privacy preferences that are independent of considerations of
reputation or deceit—they consider privacy valuable in itself.37
30. See generally Posner, The Economics of Privacy, supra note 22; Posner,
An Economic Theory of Privacy, supra note 22; Stigler, supra note 27, at 981.
31. See Posner, The Economics of Privacy, supra note 22; Posner, An
Economic Theory of Privacy, supra note 22; Stigler, supra note 27, at 981.
32. Edward Bloustein, Privacy is Dear at Any Price: A Response to Professor
Posner’s Economic Theory, 12 GA. L. REV. 429, 439 (1978).
33. See Kenneth Laudon, Markets and Privacy, 39 COMM. ASS’N
COMPUTING MACHINERY 92, 92–94 (1996).
34. Id.
35. PRISCILLA REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY: TECHNOLOGY, SOCIAL
VALUES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 48 (1995).
36. E.g., Cathy Goodwin, A Conceptualization of Motives to Seek Privacy for
Nondeviant Consumption, 1 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 261 (1992).
37. M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1131,
1142–43 (2011) (defining subjective privacy harms as those that “flow from the
perception of unwanted observation”); see also Sasha Romanosky & Alessandro
Acquisti, Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and Legal
Perspectives, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1061 (2009) (discussing the social costs
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These are likely motivated by reasons such as improving the
consumption experience and eliminating interference by
disapproving peers.38
A situation in which individuals own their personal
information can be seen as welfare-enhancing because of pure
privacy preferences that form part of Internet users’ utility
functions.39 This preference encompasses a taste for privacy in
contexts where the individual wants to keep data private for
reasons other than deception.40 Given these preferences, there is
no reason to assume that, in interactions not mediated by
consent, the gain for the acquirers of an Internet user’s
information is always larger than that person’s loss. If A
acquires B’s personal information without her consent, we often
cannot know if A’s utility is larger than B’s disutility. If the law
established a right over personal information, however, those
preferences would be reflected in a consensual agreement.41
The second critique of the traditional literature is that it
ignores the externalities in information processing.42 A privacy
interest is implicated every time information about someone is
collected or used without her consent, potentially imposing an
externality on her. The private cost of collecting personal
information in this circumstance is lower than the social cost.
Therefore, more personal information is collected than socially

and benefits associated with privacy related legislation, including legal
frameworks for the disclosure of personal information).
38. See Goodwin, supra note 36, at 263.
39. Posner also recognizes the relevance of pure privacy preferences in later
work regarding governmental surveillance. Richard Posner, Privacy,
Surveillance, and Law, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 245, 245–46 (2008).
40. See Laudon, supra note 33, at 93 (“Privacy is a moral claim of
individuals to be left alone and to control the flow of information.”).
41. See Richard Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An
Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2382 (1995); James Rule &
Lawrence Hunter, Towards Property Rights in Personal Data, in VISIONS OF
PRIVACY: POLICY CHOICES FOR THE DIGITAL AGE 168 (Colin Bennett & Rebecca
Grant eds., 1999).
42. Cf. Corien Prins, When Personal Data, Behavior and Virtual Identities
Become a Commodity: Would a Property Rights Approach Matter?, 3 SCRIPT-ED
270, 277 (2006) (“[P]rivacy can be understood as a problem of social cost, where
the actions of one agent (e.g., a mailing list broker) impart a negative
externality on another agent (e.g., an end consumer).”) (internal quotations
omitted).
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efficient.43 As long as the collector and not the Internet user
owns the personal information, people are not compensated for
the use of their personal information, and the price of such
information is too low because it fails to reflect the cost that its
use implies for them.44 Secondary use of information also poses
externalities to Internet users, which come in the form of
annoyances, such as spam, that consume time and attention.45
Giving users control over the transfer of their information
(making their agreement needed for further trade) would
internalize these externalities.46
The use of encryption has been suggested as a way to
approximate protection “from below” in the absence of legislation
that establishes it.47 Encryption allows an individual to exclude
others from information, and hence should allow for bargaining
and redistribute wealth to consumers.48 The inconvenience of
this approach is that it can be costly for Internet users to engage
in encryption and, even if they do, the aggregated cost of selfprotection would be socially wasteful.
The critiques raise more questions than they provide
answers. The first critique (conceptual) does not show that more
ample concepts of privacy would lead to alternative economic
justifications that trump the early arguments on the economics
of privacy. The second critique (concerning externalities) leaves
a central issue unanswered: if transaction costs are low, then as
long as the property rights are clearly defined, the entitlement’s

43. See Laudon, supra note 33, at 99 (describing the phenomenon of a
National Information Market, where market mechanisms equilibrate supply
and demand of information).
44. See Kenneth Laudon, Extensions to the Theory of Markets and Privacy:
Mechanics of Pricing Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE
INFORMATION AGE (Barbara Wellbery ed., 1997), https://www.ntia.doc.gov
/report/1997/privacy-and-self-regulation-information-age.
45. If someone gives her telephone number to a company so it can fix her
cable, and then the company gives it to someone else that calls her at dinnertime
to sell her an insurance policy, that is a cost (in the form of attention and time
that is taken from her) that is externally imposed from the transaction between
the cable company and the insurance company. See Hal Varian, Economic
Aspects of Personal Privacy, in CYBER POLICY AND ECONOMICS IN AN INTERNET
AGE 127 (William Lehr & Lorenzo Pupillo eds., 2002).
46. Id.
47. Eli Noam, Privacy and Self-Regulation: Markets for Electronic Privacy,
in PRIVACY AND SELF-REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra note 44, at
21.
48. Id.
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allocation should be irrelevant for total welfare, as the allocation
will not change who will hold the right ex post. In addition, the
reason why each agent values the good at any amount, and
whether there are any externalities, should also be irrelevant,
because low transaction costs allow for a bargaining process that
would internalize them, unless distribution matters.49 The
following Parts explain how efficiency considerations can justify
IPL.
II. CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
ONLINE
A. PUBLIC GOOD
A central characteristic of information is that people can
make use of it without leaving less for others and, for digitalized
information, it is easy to reproduce.50 Information, for this
reason, has public good characteristics: once released, it can be
reproduced at a marginal cost close to zero making it difficult to
monitor and control who has it (non-excludability), and the use
of information does not reduce the amount left available to
others (non-rivalry).51
Even before Samuelson’s seminal work on public goods,52
works of authorship were described as having the features of
non-excludability and non-rivalry due to the characteristics of
information.53 Shortly after, information was identified as a
public good that suffers from the problems of both nonexcludability and non-rivalry.54

49. See Coase, supra note 28.
50. See, e.g., Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,
50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1196 n.8 (1998) (“The digitalization of information
makes simple the reproduction and quick transmission of perfect copies through
cyberspace.”).
51. Stigler, supra note 27; see Paul Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and
Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2056 (2004) (discussing, at points, the market
failure associated with non-rivalry).
52. Paul Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 387 (1954).
53. See, e.g., ARNOLD PLANT, THE NEW COMMERCE IN IDEAS AND
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1953); Arnold Plant, The Economic Aspects of
Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA 167 (1934).
54. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of
Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281
(1970) (advocating for copyright as a solution to these public good problems);
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Due to its public good characteristics, the generation of
information produces positive spillovers to people other than its
creators.55 These positive spillovers, or positive externalities,
imply that the creator does not internalize all social benefits
from generating information and, for that reason she has
suboptimal incentives to produce it.56 For this reason, it might
be socially welfare-increasing in the long run to allow for greater
internalization and thereby incentivize information production
in order to ensure that a socially desirable amount is produced.57
Personal information—a type of information—features
these characteristics. Given that information has a cumulative
nature (its uses are not independent but build on each other),58
it behaves as a capital good that will present most of its benefits
in the future. Therefore, it is difficult to grasp the effects of
different kinds of information, or even information in general,
unless we take into account its long-term consequences.59
Inasmuch as information presents the characteristics of a public
good, it would be socially desirable to incentivize the generation
of more information, as well as its dissemination, which we can
call information flow.60 The next sections explore how privacy
relates to this aim.
B. LOW COMMUNICATION COSTS
Technological changes reduced the transaction costs of
gathering, storing and disseminating information; in addition,

Robert Hurt & Robert Shuchman, The Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM.
ECON. REV. 421 (1966).
55. See, e.g., Stigler, supra note 27.
56. See generally id.
57. See Wendy Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s
Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. REV. 853 (1992) (analyzing
along these lines in the form of a prisoners’ dilemma where agents choose
whether to produce or reproduce information in the context of intellectual
property).
58. See generally William Landes & Richard Posner, An Economic Analysis
of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 325–27 (1989).
59. From this perspective, information is socially valuable in a way that is
difficult to quantify. Determining how far in the future one wants to look and
what discount rate one wants to apply are only the first obstacles to
specification of its social benefits. This is also the case, for example, of
environmental goods. See, e.g., Heinz Kurz, Goods and Bads: Sundry
Observations on Joint Production, Waste Disposal, and Renewable and
Exhaustible Resources, 3 PROGRESS INDUS. ECOLOGY 280 (2006).
60. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 41.
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Internet users voluntarily give personal information via peer-topeer sharing.61 These characteristics make the marginal cost of
acquiring information close to zero.62 In the context of
information technology, personal information exchanges have
strikingly low costs of communication.63
In the old days, when someone wanted information about
someone else, she would incur costs to obtain the data. These
costs were incurred, for example, in chasing a celebrity in the
street to take pictures of her, eavesdropping on a conversation
behind a door, peeking through a keyhole, or wiretapping a
telephone line. Some current ways of acquiring information
about someone, such as compromising their cybersecurity with
a virus or looking for their information in search engines, follow
a structure similar to the traditional market for personal
information. However, they present lower transaction costs—a
script can do the work that in other times required personnel
and expensive equipment.64 Using these tools, the person who
desires information must engage in some degree of search costs
to acquire it, but these costs are often lower than those of
traditional privacy invasions.65 Looking for someone’s details in
a search engine, for example, is easier and less costly than going
through her correspondence, wiretapping her telephone, or
questioning her friends.
The market for personal information online, oftentimes,
does not follow this pattern due to its different technological
characteristics: reduced costs and peer-to-peer sharing.66 In
some markets for personal information online, where online
profiling is used,67 the information producer (Internet user) puts
61. See, e.g., Schaumann, supra note 8, at 1002.
62. See Ku, supra note 8, at 274.
63. See, e.g., Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 231 (1996) (commenting that, for low transaction-cost
situations, a “property entitlement for such items seems sensible”).
64. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1619 (attributing the Internet’s
prominence in information “production, distribution, and manipulation . . . [to
its] impressive ability to increase the speed and lower the costs of transferring
and sharing information”).
65. Cf. id.
66. Cf. Sovern, supra note 6 (discussing how to further reduce consumers’
transaction costs for privacy protection).
67. Profiling is the assembling of personal information from different
sources to generate a complete database of an Internet user. See, e.g., Roger
Clarke, Profiling: A Hidden Challenge to the Regulation of Data Surveillance, 4
J.L. & INF. SCI. 403, 404–05 (1993).
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the information in the acquirer’s hands, seemingly for free.68
Under this mechanism (described before as the peer-to-peer or
Web 2.0)69 the acquisition of information has not merely a
reduced marginal cost compared to the traditional privacy
scenario, but a marginal cost of zero.
This mechanism can operate through monitoring active and
passive digital footprints.70 Regarding active digital footprints,
social network companies do not need to incur additional costs
to discover personal information about their users because, by
utilizing the social network, the users provide that information
by themselves.71 Similarly, the other users do not need to ask
their friends and acquaintances for their recent pictures and
updates because they often send them through the social
networks. Cloud computing companies, similarly, do not need to
inquire about which kind of files their users manage because, by
using the cloud computing service, the users show that
information to the companies voluntarily.
Regarding passive digital footprints, the Internet has
technologies such as http cookies and fingerprinting that create
data trails without the user attempting to do so—and the
technologies can do this without the user’s knowledge.72 Even
technologies not specifically designed to create data trails
generate user-metadata associated with the places where the
user places attention, and therefore also collect information.73

68. Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein,
Privacy and Human Behavior in the Age of Information, 347 SCIENCE 509 (2015)
(weighing the possible benefit and detriments of the fact that we now share
information online, “both knowingly and unwittingly – to one another, to
commercial entities, and to our governments”).
69. LESSIG, supra note 7.
70. See, e.g., Digital Footprint, TECHTERMS, https://techterms.com
/definition/digital_footprint (last visited Feb. 5, 2017) (“A ‘passive digital
footprint’ is a data trail you unintentionally leave online [like your browsing
history]. . . . An ‘active digital footprint’ includes data that you intentionally
submit online [like sending an email].”).
71. E.g., id. (“[P]osting social media updates are another popular way to
expand your digital footprint.”). These companies have built an infrastructure
that represents fixed costs, while the marginal costs of acquiring information
from Internet users is close to zero.
72. See Schwartz, supra note 4, at 1624–25.
73. Id. at 1625 (“Once Web sites identify a specific visitor, they can match
her to their rich stores of ‘clickstream data,’ which is information about the
precise path a user takes while browsing at a Web site, including how long she
spent at any part of a site.”).
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The counterpart to this reduction in the cost of collecting
and disseminating information is the increased cost of protecting
one’s personal information. Surveillance is more difficult to
detect in cyberspace than in physical spaces, which means that
preventing such surveillance is more costly.74
Protecting one’s privacy on the Internet requires technical
skills that not all Internet users possess and, for those who do,
this protection is costly.75 The tradeoff between the benefits
obtained for data disclosures and their expected privacy cost is
opposed to another tradeoff between privacy and convenience.
For example, browsing through anonymity networks such as
TOR—one of the most effective means of self-protection—leads
to a reduction in usability (for example, users need to retype all
registration data on each access) and to a decrease in browsing
speed.76 Moreover, monitoring one’s personal information after
disclosure is rarely possible and, when so, is costly.77 There is as
of yet no equivalent for the Internet to the sealed envelopes for
postal secrecy, which could easily tell us if someone opened our
correspondence and tip us off on what they could have learned.78
C. A GOOD THAT IS NOT YET AVAILABLE
Irrespective of low transaction costs and clearly defined
rights, entitlements’ allocations have distributional effects.79 If
A values a good more than B, and the entitlement over it is given
to A, B can obtain the good only after bargaining with A if
protected by property, or compensating A if protected by
liability. Although irrelevant for total welfare, both A and B care
about who initially has the entitlement. B had to give something
to A to obtain the good; if B had been given the entitlement in

74. See Clarke, supra note 67 (presenting an early argument for regulation
in this area).
75. Moreover, this could be considered suspicious behavior, and result in
increased governmental surveillance.
76. See Tor: Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview
(last visited Feb. 5, 2017) (providing “both organizations and individuals [the
ability] to share information over public networks without compromising their
privacy”).
77. See id. TOR provides an anonymized pathway to prevent surveillance
of Internet traffic. Id.
78. See Susan Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous
Technology, 75 MISS. L.J. 1 (2005).
79. See generally Coase, supra note 28.
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the first place, she would have been wealthier by the end of the
transaction.
This distributional effect is relevant for the production of
goods. If Internet user A is in a position to produce a good and
trade with service provider B and, in contrast to the scenario in
the last paragraph, the entitlement over that good is given to B
ex ante, A will lack incentives to produce it.80 Entitlements
determine the incentives for investment to generate goods
because they determine who will get paid in the trades that will
take place if those goods exist.81 Hence, it affects goods’
production levels.82
The mechanisms to generate information either actively or
passively described in the last section illustrate that the amount
of personal information available is not fixed. A significant
portion of such information is produced by users of these services
depending on how much (and how many) services they consume.
These data, in turn, do not fulfill the characteristics of a good
until disclosed to others (becoming available information)
because, before the disclosure takes place, they are not available
for use and therefore unable to satisfy other people’s needs.83
In turn, personal data disclosure by Internet users implies
expected privacy costs—which depend on the type and amount
of data disclosed. The more personal data disclosed by an
Internet user in the use of these products, the higher the risk
that she faces harm in the form of a privacy breach. This often
leads Internet users, in the absence of regulatory protection, to
engage in socially costly self-protection. Internet users face
expected costs of privacy breach both in their initial production
of information and the subsequent information trades between

80. This is analogous to the reason why most legal systems establish
protections in the form of entitlements for intellectual property (i.e., to
incentivize production in the first place), as it is evaluated below.
81. See Oliver Hart & John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the
Firm, 98 J. POL. ECON. 1119, 1120 (1990); Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith,
Making Coasean Property More Coasean, 54 J.L. & ECON. S77, S90 (2011); see
also Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics, 111 YALE L.J. 357 (2001).
82. See sources cited supra note 81.
83. Goods have been defined as materials that can readily satisfy human
wants, and in such way, increase utility. See Murray Milgate, Goods and
Commodities, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS (Lawrence
Blume & Steven Durlauf eds., 2008).
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data collectors, intermediaries, and advertisers.84 Information
processing produces an externality problem 85: the company that
carries it out obtains the full benefits of processing—via
marketing gains or fee gains with the sale of such information—
but does not suffer the expected losses produced by such
disclosure of personal data. Hence, it has incentives to overuse
users’ personal information.86
III. PRODUCTION OF PERSONAL INFORMATION ONLINE
A. BY-PRODUCT
Unlike standard goods, people do not produce their personal
information deliberately to sell it to companies online.87 App
developers, for example, do not ask people directly at each
moment where they are, but instead offer them a product to
monitor their walking distances and calorie expenditure, which
also records their location data.88
When Internet users consume goods such as an app or
website, the website, or advertisers, can profit from their time
and attention.89 With goods like social networks and cloud
computing, the good’s consumption (time at the website)
produces another good (personal information).90 The more
someone uses Facebook, the more Facebook knows about her,
and the more files she uploads to Dropbox, the more Dropbox

84. See John Hagel & Jeffrey Rayport, The Coming Battle for Consumer
Information, 75 HARV. BUS. REV. 53 (1997).
85. See, e.g., Laudon, supra note 33; Varian, supra note 45.
86. PETER SWIRE & ROBERT LITAN, NONE OF YOUR BUSINESS: WORLD DATA
FLOWS, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE AND THE EUROPEAN PRIVACY DIRECTIVE 8
(1998).
87. This has some exceptions, such as autobiographies. Cf. Murphy, supra
note 41, at 2408–10 (recounting a breach of privacy, when a psychiatrist’s
biography improperly reported details of a confidential counseling session).
88. See generally Richard Cornes & Todd Sandler, Easy Riders, Joint
Production and Public Goods, 94 ECON. J. 580 (1984).
89. See Alexander Furnas, It’s Not All About You: What Privacy Advocates
Don’t Get About Data Tracking on the Web, ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/its-not-all-about-youwhat-privacy-advocates-dont-get-about-data-tracking-on-the-web/254533/
(“The Internet of free platforms, free services, and free content is wholly
subsidized by targeted advertising, the efficacy (and thus profitability) of which
relies on collecting and mining user data.”).
90. See, e.g., Clarke, supra note 67, at 409 (discussing the potential
downsides of acquisition of personal information from profiling).
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knows about her. This personal information is useful to the
service providers because it allows them to not only show
advertisements but also personalize their content, increasing ad
relevance and thus the sales of the products advertised.91
From this perspective, personal information is a by-product
of the activity of using the product. For the user, consuming a
social network is tied to producing personal information. This
exchange functions differently than those of standard goods.
When users generate personal information by using the product,
they do not produce a good deliberately. People do not say, for
example, “I need to generate more personal information to buy
more time at Facebook”; they just know that the more they use
the product, the more personal information about them that will
be in the market. While they consume the web service, they
produce personal information, which is a good for the service
provider.
Generating this product has an expected (private) cost: the
increased risk of a privacy leak together with the disutility of
sharing personal information from pure privacy preferences.92
The dissemination of personal information (information
processing), as it increases the probability of a privacy leak,
creates in rational users an expected cost function for the
production of personal information which, when it gets too high,
stops them from continuing to use the product.93 They weigh the
marginal benefit of using the website against the marginal cost
of disclosure.94
A data-protection statute does not have the same effect in
this context as the effect for traditional privacy exchanges
described by the first-generation economics of privacy.95 The byproduct characteristic of personal information accounts for why
it is produced even in the absence of exclusion rights, and at the
same time why there are limits on its production.
Picture someone using a web service, where her
consumption is measured by the extent of the service’s use. As
she uses the web service, she produces as a by-product the
91. See id. (warning that such advertising can “cross[ ] a boundary to
become consumer manipulation”).
92. See Kang, supra note 50, at 1246 (discussing motivating factors for the
consumer to withhold private information).
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., id. at 1247.
95. See supra Section I.B (discussing first-generation economics of privacy).
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personal information shared. The web service cannot be
consumed separately from producing information: if she spends
time in the network, personal information about her will be
available to the service providers. The production of information,
in turn, has the cost for the user of expected privacy breach and
disutility from sharing, where the more information shared, the
higher the risk of a privacy breach.96 The Internet user’s utility
from using the web service is determined by how much she uses
it.97 Her expected utility function is formed by the utility from
using the web service minus the cost of producing the
information.98
Maximizing the Internet user’s utility function results in
limiting her web service’s consumption to the point where her
marginal benefit of consuming the website equals her marginal
cost of producing information.99 After this point, the cost of
producing information is too high for her. Because the website
cannot be consumed without producing information, the
Internet user stops consuming it. Thus, the web service’s level of
use is limited by the production costs of personal information.100
This mechanism is seen, for example, with people who do
not have a social network account because of privacy concerns
although they otherwise would like to have one. The social
network could profit from them, and they could profit from using
the social network if there were a way for them to use the
product without revealing personal information and receiving
only non-personalized advertisements.
This scenario is the result of an asymmetric information
problem that prevents these users from accessing the product
because the service provider ignores the exact privacy sensitivity
of its consumers.101 This problem prevents the service provider
96. Cf. Noam, supra note 47 (discussing the Internet consumer’s privacybased motivations).
97. Cf. id.
98. Cf. id.
99. A special case would be one in which the marginal cost curve always
lies above the marginal utility curve, and hence the two curves do not intersect.
This would be the case of people with high pure privacy preferences, who do not
share personal information.
100. This is often the case in environmental economics, with the difference
that, in such cases, the by-product is often a bad instead of a good. See Kurz,
supra note 59, at 282.
101. For a discussion on the asymmetric information problem of privacy, see
generally sources cited, supra note 22.
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from perfectly distinguishing among its users based on how
privacy sensitive they are: the provider cannot distinguish
between consumers based on the shape of the consumers’ cost
functions and allow some of them to consume the product while
producing a smaller amount of personal information.102
However, social networks are able to partially discriminate
among Internet users according to their sensitivity by offering
different menus to choose from, which can function as a
signaling device. These devices are different combinations of
privacy settings and website functionality.103 This choice allows
Internet users to have different degrees of privacy preferences
in the product, choosing the available combination that best
satisfies their preferences.104 Hence, Internet users can choose
the combination that gives them the highest utility, allowing for
the possibility of a separating equilibrium based on their privacy
sensitivity.105
A very high level of privacy that takes a regulatory approach
to protecting data and limits information’s alienability would
disallow Internet users to produce certain levels of information
and, in such a way, would restrict the scope of possible choices.
This would not only restrict the web service’s business model but
also reduce Internet users’ utility. In this scenario, it would be
better for IPL to adopt an approach closer to contract law and
focus on enforcing the voluntary choices of the users and the
network, and ensuring that they are made with informed
consent. A privacy approach that allowed Internet users to
trade, and thus gave them freedom of choice to express their
privacy preferences, would accomplish this task.
B. EFFECT OF PRIVACY ON INFORMATION PRODUCTION
Under a static or allocative analysis, information is
inversely related to the degree of privacy: the less privacy
protection, the fewer rights that people will be able to exert over

102. See generally sources cited, supra note 22.
103. See generally id.
104. Cf. id. For example, Google and Microsoft do this for their email
services, and Facebook does so for its social network.
105. If personal information were not a by-product, services such as social
networks would only have incentives to offer this kind of product differentiation
due to the pressure of competition. See Ruben Rodrigues, Privacy on Social
Networks, in THE OFFENSIVE INTERNET, supra note 25, at 237 (addressing the
effect of competitive pressure on product differentiation for social networks).
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pieces of information, and the more personal information that
will be available. This was the underlying idea in the firstgeneration literature on the economics of privacy.106
Under an analysis that includes dynamic effects, however,
because personal data has the characteristics of a good that is
costly to produce and is not yet available, the disclosure of
personal data largely depends on the entitlement’s allocation.107
Allocating the entitlement to Internet users through privacy,
therefore, becomes relevant. Some degree of privacy incentivizes
the generation of information and, consequently, an increase in
information flow, because privacy enables exchanges of pieces of
information that would otherwise not be generated. This
mechanism is similar to the exclusion from products protected
under copyright law, which is weighed in the long run against
access to creations that take place due to the incentives set by
these laws.108
Consider as an example the number of people who, under
current regulation, abstain from using social networks because
of privacy concerns. With a higher level of privacy protection,
these concerns would not arise or not be as significant, and those
users would not need to abstain from using social networks.
They would produce, in their use, information that under
current regulation is not being generated.
This effect will be shaped by the entitlement’s protection. A
regime with no privacy at all would have a low level of
information production (dynamic effect) but a high level of
information flow of the information produced (static effect). A
regime on the other end of the spectrum would produce the
opposite result: a high level of information production (dynamic
effect) but a low level of information flow (static effect). Due to
the dynamic effect, a very low level of privacy would lead to a
low level of information production because Internet users would
106. Cf. Murphy, supra note 41, at 2382 (stating that “the common
law . . . from the get-go . . . has been hostile to privacy claims”).
107. See generally Merrill & Smith, What Happened to Property in Law and
Economics, supra note 81, at 375 (explaining the basis of entitlement).
108. While the static and dynamic effects work in opposite directions, it is
likely that, up to a certain level of protection, the second overcomes the first in
the long term. See generally Stanley M. Besen & Leo J. Raskind, An
Introduction to the Law and Economics of Intellectual Property, 5 J. ECON.
PERSP. 3, 11–18 (1991) (explaining this logic in Intellectual Property). A closer
evaluation of the common elements between IPL and copyright is done below in
Part V.
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be under-incentivized to produce such information. Due to the
static effect, an extremely high level of privacy protection would
lead to little information flow because little would be shared.109
Due to this interrelation between the static effect on
information flow and the dynamic effect on the generation of
information, the relationship between privacy and the amount
of personal information seems to follow a hill-shaped concave
function. To maximize the amount of information in the market,
the law must set a level of privacy high enough to incentivize
information production, but not so high as to halt information
flow. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Illustrating the Relationship Between Data
Protection and Amount of Information
A caveat to this argument is that some amount of personal
information is likely to be produced even in the absence of IPL.
In the function mentioned, the curve would therefore intersect
the y-axis above zero. The explanation is that, as the previous

109. This would be a more extreme system than that of PETs, see supra
Section III.A, which seek to allow for high privacy preservation while allowing
the sharing of high-value data for socially valuable aims such as research. A
PET-based system, in the ideal types identified here, also lies in the middle of
both extreme regimes.
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section showed, personal information is produced as a byproduct of online activity.
In sum, due to the technological characteristics that
underpin personal information online, the costs of
communicating information are low, but this says little about
the costs of transacting over the entitlement. Moreover, the
current arguments fail to consider how the level of privacy
increases the supply of information. For this reason, the
objections to privacy protection often invoked in the economics
literature are largely inapplicable to contemporary IPL.
Having established that the entitlements over personal
information allocated by IPL are desirable, we turn to ask how
to best protect them.
IV. PROTECTION MECHANISMS
A. PROTECTING PRIVACY WITH PROPERTY
From an efficiency point of view, one can distinguish three
types of protection over entitlements: property, liability, and
inalienability rules.110 We can ask, under this framework, which
of these three is an efficient mechanism to protect privacy
entitlements.
Entitlements protected by a property rule can only be
transferred with the title-holder’s consent and in exchange for a
price determined through bargaining.111 Those protected by a
liability rule, on the other hand, can be transferred without the
title-holder’s consent and in exchange for a collectively
determined price.112 Liability rules are used mainly due to high
transaction costs of ex ante bargaining—or an actual
impossibility.113 Entitlements protected by an inalienability rule
are not transferable, and if the transfer somehow takes place,
the law sets back or nullifies the transfer to the extent
possible.114
110. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18.
111. See id. at 1106 (stressing the need to enforce voluntary contracts during
transfers).
112. See, e.g., id. at 1107–10 (identifying eminent domain as one of several
examples of liability rules in use).
113. See id. at 1110 (stating that “efficiency is not the sole ground for
employing liability rules rather than property rules”).
114. Id. at 1092–93 (“An entitlement is inalienable to the extent that its
transfer is not permitted between a willing buyer and a willing seller.”).
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Property rules have been proposed as a protection
mechanism that could forbid extracting information from
Internet users without their consent, hence protecting their
privacy.115 Property-rule protection of personal information can
be portrayed as a non-collection default, which applies unless
consent is given.116 If the individual to whom the information
refers has an entitlement over it, and it is protected by a
property rule, she can control the dissemination of her personal
information after it is disclosed.117 On the other hand, if data
collectors own the entitlement, then the default is collection.118
The non-collection default rule (a privacy rule) has been
considered welfare increasing for three reasons.119 The first
reason is that technologies have decreased the transaction costs
of acquiring people’s personal information—once it is
produced.120 But these costs are asymmetric: if entitlements
with a property rule were given to data collectors, individuals
would face high costs for knowing what information about them
was disseminated or will be disseminated—which is needed to
engage in negotiations. This cost would be low for data
collectors.121 This implies that overall transaction costs would be

115. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 41; Prins, supra note 42, at 271 (“With the
growing economic importance of services based on the processing of personal
data, it is clear that ownership rights in personal data become the key
instrument in realizing returns on the investment.”); Schwartz, supra note 51.
116. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1092 (explaining that
“entitlement is protected by a property rule to the extent that someone who
wishes to remove the entitlement from its holder must buy it from him in a
voluntary transaction in which the value of the entitlement is agreed upon by
the seller”); Ignacio Cofone, The Way the Cookie Crumbles: Online Tracking
Meets Behavioural Economics, 25 INT’L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 38 (2016) (explaining
the dynamic of non-collection default rules).
117. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18 (stating that each party gets
to determine how much the entitlement is worth to them).
118. Murphy, supra note 41.
119. These have been formulated with the language of property rights.
Under the Calabresi and Melamed framework, a property right is a type of
entitlement that can be protected by a property rule, a liability rule, or an
inalienability rule. However, when someone refers to a property right, they
often mean one protected by a property rule. One can see from the language
used in the literature, and also by the emphasis placed on consent, that the
arguments are made with a property rule in mind. See, e.g., id.
120. See Kang, supra note 50.
121. See id. (explaining that the harvesting of data is done automatically by
computers at little cost).
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reduced if the entitlements over personal information were
allocated to Internet users with a property rule.
Under a regime with no privacy, companies lack incentives
to make it easy for Internet users to control their personal
data.122 Giving rights over such information to users would force
a negotiation that would alter this.123 Privacy-enhancing
technologies (PETs) are a response from users to this lack of
protection, allowing them a higher level of control over their
personal information.124 Some consider these market-based
mechanisms desirable in the face of new technologies.125
However, self-protection implies costs that would be spared with
a property rule.126
Property rules would allow for a market for personal
information in which each Internet user could negotiate with
firms regarding which uses they are willing to allow with
regards to their personal information and for what
compensation.127 By becoming owners of their personal
information, Internet users would be able to extract more for its
release than under a no-property rule, and they would receive

122. LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999); see
LESSIG, CODE 2.0, supra note 7, at 218 (explaining how the absence of incentives
to maintain privacy interferes with our “desire to live in separate communities,
or among or within separate normative spaces,” and how this could have
dangerous consequences for, as an example, “a gay man in an intolerant small
town”).
123. See LESSIG, CODE 2.0, supra note 7; see also Julie Cohen, Examined
Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373
(2000).
124. See GW VAN BLARKOM ET AL., HANDBOOK OF PRIVACY AND PRIVACYENHANCING TECHNOLOGIES, THE CASE OF INTELLIGENT SOFTWARE AGENTS 33
(2003) (stating that typical PETs include encryption tools and IP masks).
125. See Laudon, supra note 33 (advocating one solution to the problem).
126. Cf. Prins, supra note 42, at 277 (commenting that “although some try
to protect their privacy by applying techniques to ‘hide’ their data, actual and
effective transparency and control seems unattainable”).
127. See id.; LESSIG, supra note 7, at 85–90, 229 (“[A] property rule . . . would
reinforce whatever diversity people had about views about their privacy—
permitting some to choose to waive their rights and others to hold firm.”);
Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRACT. 56,
63–65 (1999) (arguing for a market solution to privacy problems); Patricia Mell,
Seeking Shade in a Land of Perpetual Sunlight: Privacy as Property in the
Electronic Wilderness, 11 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 57–64 (1996) (discussing
generally some theories of tort recovery for breaches of the privacy obligation);
Murphy, supra note 41.
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compensation for the expected privacy cost associated with each
information disclosure.128
From the perspective of information production, we can add
two reasons for the desirability of property rules. First, property
rules would internalize ex ante the externalities of information
processing (which increase the risk of privacy breaches) and
would thereby incentivize information production.129 Second,
they would allow for subsequent sales once information is
acquired—as with any product where when one can re-sell an
item after buying it.130 In this way, property rules would keep
transaction costs low.131 If companies had to ask Internet users
for permission each time such information was traded,
transaction costs would be too high, which would decrease
information flow.132 The ability to protect privacy without
interfering with subsequent sales is, from this perspective, a
desirable attribute of property rules.
B. DRAWBACKS OF PROPERTY RULES IN IPL
Despite their advantages, property rules could generate new
problems in the interaction between Internet users and data
collectors and processors. Namely, ineffectiveness due to
bargaining positions, under-protection of information obtained
through data mining, and a principal-agent problem.
Regarding bargaining, due to the type of interactions in
which privacy policies are involved, where Internet users have a
take-it-or-leave-it option, it is unclear to what extent property
rules would improve their situation when compared to a no128. See Prins, supra note 42, at 271 (“[M]arket-oriented mechanisms based
on individual ownership of personal data could enhance personal data
protection. If ‘personal data markets’ were allowed to function more effectively,
there would be less privacy invasion.”); cf. Mell, supra note 127, at 26–27
(explaining that as it is now, individuals have little control over the exploitation
of their personal information).
129. See supra Section II.E; see also Peter P. Swire, Markets, SelfRegulation, and Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal
Information, in PRIVACY AND SELF REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE,
supra note 44, ch. 1, art. A (“The case for . . . self-regulation is especially strong,
however, where there are important network externalities.”).
130. See Eli M. Noam, Privacy and Self-Regulation: Markets for Electronic
Privacy, in PRIVACY AND SELF REGULATION IN THE INFORMATION AGE, supra
note 44, ch. 1, art. B (arguing that if such sales are made illegal, it would not
stop the sales from occurring, but merely cause sales to be more expensive).
131. See id.
132. See id. (stressing the importance of keeping overall prices low).
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property rule. Under a property rule, users could well face a
take-it-or-leave-it option between using the product and giving
their personal information for free, or not using the product at
all.133 If they need to use the service, this consent would then not
fully be given freely.134 In addition, it would be difficult for an
average Internet user to properly assess the risks of selling the
right over her personal information.135 Internet users generally
face difficulties in assessing the risks of disclosing, because they
do not always know how their data will be aggregated and what
can be done with it—there is an information asymmetry
problem.136 The costs of assessing risks when selling rights over
information would therefore be high.137
Information assembled by compiling different types of
information provided by the Internet user to different companies
at different times, called data mining, would be unprotected by
property rules. The Internet user would have ex ante
compensation for each piece of information released to each data
collector.138 However, she would not have ex ante compensation
for the aggregated information, which is more valuable and,
more importantly for the incentives to generate information,
potentially more harmful.139 Taken individually, these pieces of
data might not be valuable enough to induce companies and
Internet users to bargain over them,140 but combined they
present costs to users. People will lack incentives to incur risks
133. Cf. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L.
REV. 1125, 1162 (1999) (describing the contractual elements of this
relationship).
134. Cf. id. (stating that “the more the site seeks consent for collection and
use of personal data, the more robust the firm’s representations about the
integrity of its data and the security with which it maintains the data”).
135. See id. at 1128 (noting that some commentators think the law should
supply corrective measures in these circumstances).
136. See id. at 1145 (explaining that data collection firms may gain broad
access to a person’s personal data).
137. See id. (adding that while most objects that are sold can be replaced,
one cannot replace personal data once it is disclosed).
138. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1092 (“Property rules
involve a collective decision as to who is to be given an initial entitlement but
not as to the value of the entitlement.”).
139. See Samuelson, supra note 133, at 1138 (describing how some
individuals might prefer their information not be shared with these later
parties).
140. See, e.g., Emily Steel et al., How Much is Your Personal Data Worth?,
FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2013, 8:11 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/927ca86e-d29b11e2-88ed-00144feab7de.html?ft_site=falcon#axzz4a25NNzC3.
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to disclose pieces of their personal data if they are paid very little
for each of them while they face a high expected cost for them in
aggregate.
Property rules over personal information could also
introduce a principal-agent problem. If data collectors paid
Internet users a price for their personal information, and those
users were therefore already compensated, then data collecting
companies would have no incentives to incur costs of care or to
moderate activity levels (information processing) to avoid
breaches.141 The data collector would have full control over the
information—which affects the Internet user’s welfare—and
incentives to over-process information and under-invest in care,
increasing the risk of data breaches ex post.142 This problem
arises because property rules are satisfied only at the start,
allowing the acquirer to forget about potential externalities later
on—unlike liability rules, which can impose costs at all moments
of the decision-making process.143 Even if the expected
externalities can be calculated into the price, companies have no
incentives to take care ex post. For these reasons, even if
property rules seem to provide a strong protection, they might
not change the situation for Internet users significantly after all.
If users are rational, they will anticipate this increase in
risk and, consequently, they would increase the price demanded
for their personal information in accordance with those
increased risks. This increase in the price of information
produced by property rules would not necessarily be desirable
for the aim of increasing the amount of information available.
The price increase would reduce the demand for such
information in equilibrium, which would reduce the supply of
information to meet that demand.144 In this way, property rules
would fail to increase the amount of personal information
available.
If property rules are traditionally suggested for scenarios
with low transaction costs and Internet reduces the cost of

141. See id. at 1010–11 (suggesting that, despite earlier sentiments to the
contrary, “it is [now] much easier than was previously assumed” to improperly
use aggregated data to extract identifiable personal information).
142. See id.
143. This element has been considered a drawback of property rules, for
example, in environmental law for the calculations of carbon dioxide emissions.
144. See Murphy, supra note 41, at 2385 (describing the “efficiency loss”
associated with inhibited information disclosure due to higher cost).
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communications (and therefore the cost of transacting, keeping
all else stable), one could ask why property rules fail to
accomplish their goals in the privacy context. Here we must
recall that, for personal information, the cost of generating the
good is the expected cost of a breach that can result from
disclosure: the more personal information released, the higher
the expected cost of a privacy breach. A property rule implies
that the Internet user has to know the expected value of the data
breach to ask for an equivalent price and be compensated ex
ante.145 From this perspective, a strict liability rule makes it
easier to define expectations than does a property rule.146
Privacy breaches involve several potential parties who are
unidentifiable ahead of time, many of whom only come into
contact with the data ex post. For this reason, negotiating over
one’s information has high costs, even when communication
costs are low. In turn, the disincentives for investment in the
generation of personal information depend on the expected cost
of breach—not the costs of a production process.147 For this
reason, the transaction costs of protection are more relevant
than the transaction costs of communications to set a rule to
protect privacy entitlements. This leads to considering the
possibility of protecting data with liability rules.
C. A (STRICT) LIABILITY SYSTEM FOR PRIVACY
Liability rules for personal information—which would be
similar to the privacy tort—would present a lower level of
exclusion than would property rules. Under this rule, consent
would not be a prerequisite for the transfer and Internet users
would be unable to prevent a company from selling their

145. On the other hand, under a strict liability rule, if we assume perfect
assessment, in case of a breach the Internet user would be compensated ex post
with an amount that will leave her indifferent with respect to a non-breach
situation.
146. See generally Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between
Consensual and Nonconsensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J.
235 (1995) (arguing that liability rules are more efficient than property rules,
even without prohibitively high transaction costs, when those transaction costs
stem mainly from imperfect information) [hereinafter Distinguishing Between
Liability Rules]; Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a
Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
147. See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 41, at 2404 (illustrating an example of
how the expected cost of a breach determines the value of the information at
stake).
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personal information to others, or from collecting their personal
information. Still, the users would be compensated if any
collection or processing resulted in harm, for example, by
causing identity theft or the dissemination of embarrassing
information.148 Although this differs from the type of rules that
most privacy advocates defend, it is a rule that, if effective, could
leave Internet users as well off in the event of a privacy breach
as in the event of no privacy breach. This should be taken into
account to preserve their welfare and establish incentives for
them to disclose.
A liability rule would allow for subsequent sales, thus
keeping transaction costs low—this characteristic was one of the
property rule’s more attractive features.149 The liability rule
would also avoid the central problems identified for property
rules: the latter rules’ ineffectiveness due to asymmetric
bargaining positions would be remedied by collectively defined
prices in liability rules.150 Fixing damages in accordance with
the harm caused would solve the property rule’s underprotection of information obtained through data mining.151
Moreover, an ex post compensation would correct the principalagent problem by varying compensation according to levels of
care through liability.
Besides avoiding the problems generated by property rules,
liability rules would present two advantages: one regarding
conditions for harm and one regarding risk averseness.
Regarding conditions of harm, people sometimes suffer no
disutility from privacy unless they are aware of the data leak
(subjective harm). In some cases of withholding data based on a
pure privacy preference (irrespective of how others treat them
after data are disclosed), utility is not reduced until Internet

148. See Ayres & Talley, Distinguishing Between Liability Rules, supra note
146, at 235 (agreeing that “liability rules can be more efficient than property
rules when transaction costs are low”).
149. See id. at 235 (claiming that “liability rules may also have a consensual
advantage in low-transaction-cost settings (i.e., liability rules facilitate trade)”).
150. See id. at 237 (stating that in terms of bargaining position, under
Solomonic bargaining theory the “core insight was that dividing an entitlement
between two negotiators could cause more forthright and efficient bargaining”).
151. See id. at 236 n.3 (concluding that under a liability rule “even if
damages are set imprecisely, liability rules can induce beneficial nonconsensual
taking”).
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users become aware of other people’s knowledge of that
information.152
Two examples might clarify this point. On the one hand,
someone might not want her insurance company to know about
a medical condition because that could raise the premium, or she
might not want her employer to learn about the traits that make
her a less desirable employee. In those cases, she would suffer
harm irrespective if she knew that they had the information. On
the other hand, the same person might not want one’s friends to
know about a romantic comedy that she saw, or about online
forums that she frequents, because she considers these
embarrassing. In those cases, she would suffer harm only if she
knows that her friends know about these activities. Harm based
on pure privacy preferences is subjective harm: it refers to a
psychological state rather than to external consequences.153
Although this harm must also be taken into account, it
materializes only when the Internet user is aware of the breach.
This characteristic of privacy disutilities points to liability rules
as a well-suited compensation mechanism, because in these
situations there would be no welfare reduction without the
entitlement-holder’s knowledge, and hence no justification for
an ex ante compensation mechanism.
The second advantage regarding risk attitudes is that, if
Internet users are more risk-averse than data trading
companies—which is likely—then liability rules could be in the
interest of both players in the interaction even apart from their
ability to solve the principal-agent problem.154
If the amount of ex ante compensation, such as that of
property rules, is determined solely by the expected damage—
independently of the disutility that people get from risk—full ex
post compensation in the occurrence of damage would be more

152. This argument, however, has doubtful implications for data breach
notifications: it could lead one to consider that data breaches should not be
publicized when only this kind of information is involved. The conclusion is
doubtful because there could be other overriding reasons to publicize, such as
the difficulty in determining when the disutility is only of this kind, or the
importance of reducing asymmetric information in processing.
153. See Calo, supra note 37; see also Murphy, supra note 41, at 2393
(arguing that it “is the subjective privacy preference that needs to be weighed
against the value of the information”).
154. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1106 (explaining that risk
may be reduced from a liability theory because a collective determination of
value leads to quick and efficient transactions).
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valuable for users than ex ante compensation.155 On the other
hand, if the compensation does take this into account and is
higher than the expected damage to account for the disutility of
risk—leaving Internet users indifferent between ex ante and ex
post compensation—then a liability rule would be cheaper for
data collectors than a property rule.156 Under the most expensive
case of strict liability, the rule’s expected cost would not exceed
the expected cost of harm, while under a property rule they
would have to add to it a compensation for the disutility of
risk.157 This principle would be maintained even with a slight
overcompensation, as long as the overcompensation was, in
expectation, lower than the amount needed to cover risk
averseness.158 If liability rules are established when these risk
attitudes are present, this is an argument in favor of an
insurance policy that could take care of the disutility due to risk.
Last, we can ask which type of liability rule is the most
appropriate for privacy. The situations in which IPL is involved
are unilateral accidents, where the potential tortfeasors (data
collectors and data processors) control the probability of an
accident (data breach) and the extent of harm almost
exclusively.159 After data are disclosed, it leaves the Internet
user’s sphere of control, thereby rendering her unable to control
it.160 The protection mechanisms that Internet users can use
after data are disclosed have a negligible influence on the
probability of data breaches compared to the security measures
that data processors can implement.161 In addition, both the
potential tortfeasors’ care and activity levels are relevant for the

155. This assumes that the expected value of the damage is the maximum
that companies are willing to pay, and that they would not compensate users
for their risk averseness.
156. Cf. Murphy, supra note 41, at 2395 (reasoning that it is easier for a data
collector to obtain permission when it wants to reuse information, than for the
information creator to contract with all interested data collectors ex ante).
157. See id.
158. See, e.g., id. at 2397 (“An activity that may generate embarrassment or
reprobation from some sectors of society will not occur if the activity carries with
it a significant risk of being disclosed.”).
159. See Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Internalizing Identity Theft, 13 UCLA J.L. &
TECH. 1, 33 (2009) (explaining that “database providers have ultimate control
over use of personal information and protections that are in place”).
160. See id. at 1 (“One faction explains the identity theft as a problem of a
lack of control over personal information.”).
161. Id.
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accident’s probability.162 The level of database security (care
level) and the number of data transfers performed by data
collectors and data processors (activity levels) directly affect the
probability of data breaches.163 Therefore, it seems that, among
the different possible liability rules, a strict liability rule would
induce appropriate levels of care and activity most efficiently.164
D. LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITY RULES IN IPL
The central drawback of this liability rule is the large
information cost that it would entail, which might render it
inapplicable despite its theoretical benefits. If an Internet user
faces harm due to a privacy breach (for example, because her
identity is stolen) it might be unclear which company or group of
companies that held her personal information suffered a data
breach that, in turn, led to such outcome. Causality could be
difficult, if not impossible, to prove. This leads to the question of
whether this difficulty could be solved by using a model of causal
uncertainty with multiple tortfeasors, as is sometimes done with
environmental harm where responsibility is apportioned
inversely to levels of care.165
Causal uncertainty is a challenge for those types of
responsibility within tort law for which it is difficult to
determine the source of damage, such as environmental harm
and medical malpractice.166 To some degree, privacy is
162. See id. at 33 (noting that “[d]atabase operators constitute the cheapest
cost avoiders vis-à-vis individuals whose information sits in a private entity’s
database”).
163. See id. (“The relationship is so asymmetric that the individual is
literally at the mercy of the risk preferences of companies with which no
relationship has even been established.”).
164. See id. at 32–35 (suggesting strict liability for identity theft); see also
Danielle Keats Citron, Reservoirs of Danger: The Evolution of Public and
Private Law at the Dawn of the Information Age, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 241, 261–68
(2007) (reporting that the application of a negligence rule to databases for
personal information leakage has been attacked on the basis that uncertainty
would surround the level of due care, leading databases to overinvest in care).
But note that a negligence rule with an ambiguous standard would lead
potential plaintiffs to overinvest in care only up to the investment level they
would have under a strict liability rule, and this is a socially efficient level of
care for unilateral accidents because it would fully internalize the externalities
imposed.
165. Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the
Negligence Rule, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 430 (1989) (describing a model where
care and expected costs of accidents share an inverse relationship).
166. Id. at 440–41.
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analogous to these. In this context, there are two different types
of causal uncertainty problems. The first is whether any of the
defendants caused the harm, and the second (conditional on a
positive answer to the first) is who among them hurt the plaintiff
and how much.167
When the first question is answered, and causal uncertainty
appears for the second, the problem is reduced to matching each
victim with her tortfeasor.168 In these cases, market-share
liability is a solution under the assumption that the marginal
increase in the risk of harm created by each defendant to each
victim is proportional to its presence in the market. Under this
assumption, the marginal increase of risk to the potential
victims will be equal to the firm’s market share. For the
assumption to be verified, potential tortfeasors must have
similar care levels and they must have activity levels
proportional to their market shares.
This assumption seems to hold in the leading market share
liability case Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,169 where market
share liability removed from victims the burden of proving which
among the drug producers that harmed them as a group harmed
each of them individually.170 The assumption also seems
appropriate in cases of recurring harms between parties.171 Even
though these situations present some degree of uncertainty
concerning the identity of the tortfeasor for each victim, the
uncertainty over tortfeasors in the aggregate is low because the
marginal increase in the risk of damage for the entire set of
plaintiffs is (considered) proportional to market share.172
167. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A
“Public Law” Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 855–57 (1984).
168. Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring
Wrongs, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 691, 697–98 (1990).
169. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980). In the case, pregnant mothers used a
diethylstilbestrol-based drug (DES) to prevent miscarriage, which caused their
daughters (later on known as “the DES daughters”) to develop cancer twenty
years later. In the DES cases this assumption is reasonable because all
defendants engaged in an identical activity. See Glen Robinson, Multiple
Causation in Tort Law: Reflections on the DES Cases, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 722
(1982).
170. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936–37.
171. Levmore, supra note 168, at 697.
172. See generally William Kruskal, Terms of Reference: Singular Confusion
About Multiple Causation, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 427 (1986); William Landes &
Richard Posner, Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980).
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The assumption that the marginal increase in the risk of
harm created by each defendant to each victim is proportional to
its presence in the market, however, is rarely valid for
companies collecting and processing personal information.
Personal information trades do not always have a negative
impact on Internet users’ well-being. The trade of information is
sometimes harmless and, when it is not, the possibility that it
presents of creating harm largely depends on care levels. The
type of uncertainty problem that appears for privacy is not the
matching problem between individuals from a pool of plaintiffs
and individuals from a pool of defendants, but the more general
uncertainty of the wrongdoers’ identity.
This problem was addressed by laws that require companies
to notify their customers in the event of data breach—such as
the Personal Data Notification and Protection Act introduced in
Congress in 2015173—which marginally reduce the information
problem. However, other problems remain for market share
liability to succeed in privacy. Victims of fraud or identity theft
do not always know how their data were leaked, and by whom.
Sometimes the set of necessary data is not even leaked from one
single place but elements of that set are mined from different
sources, making an efficient apportioning of responsibility
increasingly difficult.174 Moreover, an additional difficulty in
applying this market-share approach arises because companies
constantly enter and exit the market—as is often the case in
information technology. Finally, the rule works when the
possible sources of harm operate at the same level—for example,
when they are all data collectors. If companies operate at
different levels, then they operate in different markets, and
apportioning liability becomes more difficult.
Additionally, in the context of information technology,
several websites have a small market share compared to data
giants, but they still process large amounts of personal
information.175 This asymmetry could lead to the inapplicability
of market-share liability while potentially leaving some scope for
using another proxy for apportionment, such as the amount of
173. Personal Data Notification and Protection Act of 2015, H.R. 1704, 114th
Cong. (2015). These protections currently exist at state level.
174. Hoofnagle, supra note 159, at 31–32.
175. Catherine Tucker, The Economics Value of Online Customer Data, at
2.2 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Background Paper No. 1, 2010), https://
www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/46968839.pdf.

2017] DYNAMIC EFFECT INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW

555

data collected or data traded. This alternative, however, would
lead to frequent solvency problems because many of these
companies have large datasets but few assets, and they would
be unable to fully compensate people for their losses. These
companies could be judgment-proof. Mandatory insurance could
be required to address this problem, but it would increase costs
and decrease the number of players in the market because those
who could not afford the increase in costs would fall out.
Last, there is an uncertainty problem that goes beyond the
causal problem: there are transaction costs in the valuation of
the harm that, in light of the problems mentioned for market
share liability, can be significant. Whoever the deciding body for
the value of the harm is, it will have to incur costs that should
be computed when deciding whether to apply a liability rule.
V. HOW PRIVACY LAW CAN FOSTER INFORMATION
A. DETERMINING IPL’S MIXED PROTECTION
The last part’s central lesson is that IPL should set a level
of exclusion that varies depending on context, and should in
general be higher than liability rules, but lower than property
rules or inalienability rules. All three types of rules applied by
themselves would present either theoretical or practical
problems that could undermine them as protection
mechanisms.176 This fits Calabresi and Melamed’s observation
that the same object can be protected by different rules
depending on circumstances,177 and it leads to the question of
how to combine them to protect personal information under IPL.
We can ask, along these lines, if there are other areas of the law
that do this, in order to find guidelines in them to construct the
best possible set of rules.
The rationale of limiting access to information by third
parties to incentivize personal information disclosure is used
canonically to justify professional confidentiality.178 Most
societies want to ensure that people are able to convey as much
176. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18 (discussing the
theoretical frameworks of the three rules).
177. Id. at 1105–06.
178. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy’s Other Path:
Recovering the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 123 (2007) (stating that
American law parted from the idea of privacy as confidentiality, while English
law maintains a notion of privacy that focuses on trust within relationships).
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information as possible to their fiduciaries (lawyers,
psychologists, priests) so they can perform appropriately in their
jobs.179 For that reason, law and professional codes of conduct
prohibit members of these professions from disclosing
information shared with them in the performance of their duties,
thus guaranteeing trust.180 A confidentiality rule preventing
members of these professions from learning the information in
the first place would be too protective and would impair the
rule’s aim. In turn, a rule that allows them to disclose everything
their clients say, analogous to no privacy, would make their
clients disclose less, if anything at all.181
This has been the justification for the attorney-client
privilege.182 Privilege is not considered the attorney’s right but
rather the client’s, and she can decide whether to raise it or
waive it; privilege has on occasion been explicitly called a rule of
privacy.183 The extent of the privilege is that attorneys cannot
disclose information without the client’s permission. In a narrow
interpretation, this includes any information conveyed in
confidence with the purpose of seeking legal advice;184 in a broad
interpretation, it includes any communication between
attorneys and their clients.185 Its justification is that attorneys
can give better legal advice if they know all relevant information
and, absent privilege, clients might withhold information.186

179. See Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359, 371–72 (1990)
(noting that “Wigmore’s idea that the privilege is needed to ensure full
disclosure [is] still the dominant theme in the literature”).
180. Id.
181. See Murphy, supra note 41, at 2406 (noting that even “merchants may
prefer privacy in many instances, because a rule favoring privacy encourages
truthful communication”).
182. The original justification appears in Wigmore’s leading book on
evidence. JOHN WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2291 (1940) (“In order to
promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by clients, the apprehension
of compelled disclosure by the legal advisers must be removed . . . .”).
183. See Geoffrey Hazard, A Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1978).
184. See FED. R. EVID. 501.
185. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2006).
186. See Allen et al., supra note 179, at 372; see also EDNA EPSTEIN, THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCT DOCTRINE 4 (4th ed.
2001) (“With fear of disclosure, all facts will not be freely revealed and legal
advice cannot be effectively given.”).
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However, while attorney-client privilege is analogous to IPL
in its aims to stimulate disclosure, it is not the most useful
guideline to determine good privacy rules for other contexts. In
speaking only to the attorney-client communication, it does not
address the full range of problems that IPL must grapple with.
Privilege does not present the problem of information’s future
use and of information’s secondary use and data transfers, which
are essential to information’s public good characteristic.
Another branch of law that displays a combination of
liability and property rules to stimulate the creation of content
is copyright.187 Copyright law, in addition, must also deal with
the public good characteristics of information and its secondary
use. It responds to the non-excludability characteristic of
information and to the need to foster it with the creation of an
entitlement that excludes others from some uses, while at the
same time it attempts to maintain low transaction costs for the
information’s transfer and future use.188 Concretely, copyright
law reserves for authors some property rights, mainly the right
to exclude others from copying.189 IPL, from the economic
perspective in which it was presented, has relevant analogies
with copyright inasmuch as they both present some level of
exclusion but do not solely consist on property rules.190
Copyright, therefore, serves as a better guideline.
B. IPL AND COPYRIGHT: COMMON GROUNDS
In their seminal article, Warren and Brandeis already relate
privacy to copyright law.191 Copyright seeks to balance
competing interests in the creation and dissemination of creative

187. Cf. Hardy, supra note 63, at 218 (noting that copyright is “only one of
several incentives that encourage the production of informational works”).
188. See Besen & Raskind, supra note 108, at 3, 14–15.
189. Id. at 12. As manifestations of copying, copyright law traditionally
grants five rights: (i) the right to reproduce, (ii) the right to prepare derivative
works, (iii) the right to distribute copies, (iv) the right to perform, and (v) the
right to display the work publicly. In the United States, this is codified at 17
U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
190. Hardy, supra note 63, at 232.
191. They based their claim on rights granted by the common law to “each
individual . . . of determining ordinarily, to what extent her thoughts,
sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.” Samuel Warren &
Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 198, 199–202, 208–
11 (1890).
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works.192 A price higher than the marginal cost of distribution
(which for digitalized information is zero) generates the dynamic
effect of incentivizing the generation of new works. This dynamic
effect is weighed against the static effect of suboptimal
dissemination.193 Authors’ protection is mainly given by the
property characteristics of copyright, which imply compensation,
while the attempt to maintain dissemination leads to the (few)
liability characteristics of copyright. From the perspective
proposed in the last section—IPL as an instrument to incentivize
the creation of information—copyright law and IPL have similar
justifications. Moreover, they have a similar way of combining
property and liability rules. Neither copyright law nor IPL
typically include inalienability rules.194
Regarding the property characteristics of copyright law,
authors holding copyright are entitled to exclude others from
copying their work.195 The holders are able to either transfer
copyright in its entirety or (more frequently) grant a license for
the use of their work in exchange for a royalty,196 partially
alienating their exclusion right, and to request injunctions for
the breach of such exclusion.197
While in real property, entitlements are often transferred in
their entirety—meaning the new owner can do with it what she
desires.198 In copyright, the copyright holder usually gives
192. See Joseph Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV.
409, 429 (2002); Glynn Lunney, Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 492–93 (1996).
193. Besen & Raskind, supra note 108, at 16 (giving as an example the need
to get permission for the creation of derivative works).
194. But see Hardy, supra note 63, at 229–30 (identifying the inalienability
aspect associate with copyright’s prohibition on bargaining away the right of
termination). Another exception is the author’s termination right, which gives
authors the right to terminate an assignment decades later, operating as a de
facto inalienability rule.
195. See generally WILLIAM CORNISH, DAVID LLEWELYN & TANYA APLIN,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PATENTS, COPYRIGHT, TRADE MARKS AND ALLIED
RIGHTS 1–41 (2013); BJ Ard, More Property-Like than Property: The Prevalence
of Property Rules in IP (SSRN Elec. Library, Working Paper No. 2,811,932,
Sept. 29, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2811932.
196. See CORNISH ET AL., supra note 195, at 525–30.
197. Id. at 72; see also Ard, supra note 195, at 30 (arguing that copyright
statutory damages awards are often high enough to function as property rules).
198. However, not all tangible property transfers are in fee simple (though
most chattel transfers are). For example, I can grant a limited easement for a
neighbor’s passage over a certain part of my land without transferring
ownership; I can grant a time- or activity-limited license for entry to my land,
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permission for a particular use—the holder can state the
purpose.199 In this regard, licenses under copyright law are
somewhat analogous to the purpose limitation principle under
European Data Protection Law (DPL), according to which
information cannot be processed in a way incompatible with the
purposes for which it was collected.200 Both of them specify the
objective for which the information can be used and forbid its use
for other purposes.201 They are an element of a property rule
within the system, where the entitlement-holder has the right to
exclude others from uses different than the one specified.202 The
difference between them is that in copyright, the entitlementholder over the original data sets the purpose in drafting the
license, while in IPL the individual who generates the data does
not. Instead, the transferee (data collector or processor) makes
this decision, even if in some systems such as European DPL she
is not completely free in doing so but must remain within an
established legitimizing purpose.203
Under both copyright (or, more generally, under intellectual
property law) and IPL, each type of information should ideally
have a different protection to incentivize it without
overprotecting it, but it is too costly for the law to account for all
nuances.204 An ideal intellectual property law in a world with
perfect information would have a different scope and breadth for
each creation. As this is not possible, however, the law uses
categories that aim to provide the appropriate level of protection
on average. Namely, intellectual property systems feature
standard protections for patented inventions and standard
protections for copyrighted works.205 IPL faces the same issue:
making anyone who exceeds that license a trespasser; and I can make a
conditional transfer such that the owner forfeits her rights if she violates the
condition.
199. See generally CORNISH ET AL., supra note 195, ch. 13.
200. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(1)(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC).
201. See CORNISH ET AL., supra note 195, ch. 13.
202. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18, at 1092.
203. EU Data Protection Law lists different means by which someone can
legitimately collect or process personal information, the most important of
which is consent from the user to whom the information relates. Other bases
are compliance of a legal obligation and public interest. See Council Directive
95/46, art. 7(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC).
204. Cf., e.g., Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1105–06 (1990) (discussing the difficulty of applying the “fair use”
standard to different types of copyrighted material).
205. See generally Besen & Raskind, supra note 108.
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the expected cost of disclosing is different for each type of
information and for each Internet user. Although it would be
ideal to de-homogenize information and have individual rules,
the information cost of this and the transaction cost of
administering the system would be too high. IPL has distinctions
that aim to work on average, for example between sensitive and
non-sensitive information.206 Depending on how finely the law
defines types, the costs would also vary within each type as well.
Regarding copyright’s liability characteristics, authors face
some compulsory licenses and have to accept fair use.207 While
compulsory licenses tend to be specific and limited, fair use is a
central trait of copyright law.208 As such, while fair use could
marginally reduce the number of works created, it represents an
advantage for the dissemination of copyrighted works, balancing
the incentive objective and the access objective mentioned
earlier.209 Like liability rules under the Calabresi-Melamed
framework, fair use is justified by high transaction costs.
Specifically, by the high transaction costs that would otherwise
be incurred in negotiating and monitoring the uses that it
protects.210 For example, the law allows to quote a scientific work
without the author’s permission because obtaining such
permission every time would create exceedingly high transaction
costs, while citations do not harm the author’s economic
interest.211 If the quotation is large enough to cover and thereby
substitute for the whole work, on the other hand, it would harm
the author’s economic interest, and the law requires permission
to do so.212 It would be unjustified to ban use when such ban
206. See, e.g., Personal Data Notification and Protection Act of 2015, H.R.
1704, 114th Cong. (2015).
207. Hardy, supra note 63, at 233; Ard, supra note 195, at 32–36 (describing
the liability rule features of copyright).
208. This is particularly so in the United States. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
209. See Leval, supra note 204, at 1110; Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Fair Use and
Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REV. 975, 981–82 (2002).
210. Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600,
1618 (1982).
211. In expectation, they do not reduce the expected number of copies sold—
in fact, they may increase sales.
212. In general, fair use finds its scope defined in the uses of the product
that do not significantly affect the economic interests of the owner and, as a
doctrine, strives to prevent the stifling of creation. See Leo J. Raskind, A
Functional Interpretation of Fair Use: The Fourteenth Donald C. Brace
Memorial Lecture, 31 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 601, 618 (1983) (noting that copyright
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would not induce a negotiation, and so generate a loss by leaving
the author uncompensated and the user without access. Fair
use, in this sense, is a tool to enhance the diffusion aspect of
copyright law.213
The same argument can be made for IPL. Demanding
authorizations from the Internet user for each secondary use of
information would significantly increase transaction costs,
especially given that personal information is valuable when
aggregated, and that information processing involves a large
number of Internet users. To avoid this consequence, IPL
presents liability rules within the scope of the purpose limitation
principle by not requiring consent for every interaction.214
Creating entitlements over personal information, and
particularly the analogy with copyright or other intellectual
property rights, has been argued before to present difficulties.215
In a thoughtful article, Samuelson has argued that establishing
a “property right” (entitlement with a property rule) over
personal information would mean, in essence, creating a new
intellectual property right.216 But this right, Samuelson argues,
would generate an incompatibility between the reasons to
protect information with intellectual property law and the
reasons to protect personal information.217
In Samuelson’s words,
[t]he economic rationale for intellectual property law arises from a
public goods problem with information products that this law strives
to overcome. In the absence of intellectual property rights, there may
be too little incentive to induce an optimal level of private investments
holders must “prove either a present or a potential economic injury to the value
of the copyrighted property” to challenge use of the property). See generally
Richard Posner, When is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992)
(discussing the level of infringement upon the original source that should be
allotted to parodies under the fair use doctrine).
213. See Gordon, supra note 210, at 1613.
214. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 7(b)–(f), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40 (EC).
215. Samuelson, supra note 133.
216. See id. Other objections to the propertization of personal information,
such as the difficulties of alienability, are also present in the article. These
objections are included in Section III.C, pertaining the difficulties of a property
rule. This conceptual objection, however, must be treated separately, because it
concerns the entitlement, and not merely the protection rule. See supra Section
III.C.
217. Samuelson, supra note 133. An earlier version of this argument is
available in Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Warren & Brandeis Redux: Finding
(More) Privacy Protection in Intellectual Property Lore, 1999 STAN. TECH. L.
REV. 8 (1999).
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in the production and dissemination of intellectual products . . . . The
prospect of being unable to recoup research and development costs
may deter such investments from being made in the first place. A
limited grant of property rights in intellectual productions gives
creators assurance that they can control the commercialization of
their work and enjoy some fruits of their labor . . . .

The standard rationale for granting property rights in
personal data is, of course, quite different.218
The considerations made in Part II contest the objection
that the law should not protect personal information with a
system analogous to copyright because the two fields are based
on different justifications. Both IPL and copyright promote the
generation of information, and have further common grounds in
the way that, to do so, they combine property and liability
rules.219
C. IPL AND COPYRIGHT: STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES
There are also, however, structural differences between the
activities affected by copyright law and IPL that justify different
treatments.
The first of these differences is that the cost of creating a
copyrighted product does not depend solely on its use ex post,
while the cost of disclosing personal information fully depends
on how it is used after the exchange—because this use
determines the expected cost of harm. For most copyrighted
works, the central costs are those of creating the work and
creating copies.220 However, for disclosing personal information,
the costs are the expected cost of harm that people face when
disclosing information (instrumental value of privacy or
objective privacy harm), and the disutility of the information
disclosure in itself (pure privacy preference or subjective privacy
harm).221 In both cases, for the good to be produced the expected
return must exceed the expected cost, but for one of them (IPL)

218. See Samuelson, supra note 133, at 1139–40 (footnotes omitted).
219. See id. at 1134 (stating that “[i]ntellectual property law grants
exclusive rights in information-based creations in order to promote
development . . . of information and a creation of new property rights seems
almost inevitable”).
220. See, e.g., Landes & Posner, supra note 58, at 336–39. One can also
imagine other costs, such as the use of the material in a way that reflects poorly
on the creator.
221. Calo, supra note 37, at 1141–43 (distinguishing between objective and
subjective privacy harms).
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the cost depends almost exclusively on the ex post incentives for
others to adjust levels of care and of activity. Because liability
rules maintain ex post incentives better than property rules, this
justifies a stronger incidence of liability rules in IPL than in
copyright.
A second difference between copyright and IPL is how the
value of information changes over time. The limited duration of
copyright responds to its length’s decreasing marginal utility
paired to its increasing marginal cost.222 Information under IPL
also has, in most cases, decreasing marginal utility of length of
protection for the creator. A leak of old personal information
tends to harm Internet users less than one of new information—
even disclosures of undesirable acts are worse when the act is
recent than when it is not. However, regarding marginal cost,
unlike copyrighted work, personal information becomes less
valuable over time as well for others. While the reputational
value of personal information seems to decrease at a relatively
slow rate for Internet users, it quickly decreases in value for its
commercial uses as it becomes outdated.223 Moreover, due to the
higher incidence of liability rules in IPL compared to copyright,
tracing the information creator to allow for secondary use once
transferred is unnecessary: companies typically do not need
consent to transfer information to third parties—and even when
they do, they can obtain consent in advance at the time they
collect the information.
Policy debates about IPL have proposed to increase
protection for old information when compared to new
information, having gone in the opposite direction from
copyright’s time limits.224 However, although not explicitly, IPL
also contains a time limit for its entitlements—the Internet
user’s death—because, unlike copyright, data-protection rights

222. Regarding marginal utility, prospective authors whom the law seeks to
incentivize will discount payoffs to present value. Regarding marginal costs,
this is mainly due to tracing the origins of old copyrighted works. See id. at 361–
63.
223. For an example of this, see Costeja’s claim in Case C-131/12, Google
Inc. v. AEPD, 2014 E.C.R. 1.
224. An example of this is the right to forget. See generally VIKTOR MAYERSCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(2009) (discussing the permanence of information in the digital age and arguing
for implementing steps that allow the Internet to “forget”).
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are not inheritable.225 The difference in the value of information
over time mentioned in the last paragraph can justify the
different time limits in the two branches of law. After the death
of the Internet user, personal information has, on average, less
value for her heirs than it did for her. This can justify its noninheritability even within the tendency of giving further
protection to older information.226
The two branches of law do present differences that can
explain why IPL should not be (and is not) subsumed under
copyright law.227 This presents a partial agreement with
Samuelson’s argument.228 While, under the argument of this
paper, it would be an overstatement to argue that there are no
common underlying reasons to protect copyright’s creations and
IPL’s personal information, the differences are large enough to
require two separate branches of law to treat them, and personal
information cannot be just another intellectual property right.
Even if we can, and we should, protect personal information in a
system analogous to copyright law, we should not protect it with
copyright law directly.229
These considerations point to an economic justification for
having within IPL a system similar to copyright with a
combination of property and liability rules, where only some
rights from the bundle (as property is often characterized) are
reserved.230 As with Creative Commons, which proposed a
successful model to protect creations with a lower level of
exclusion than traditional copyright law, we should discuss

225. Edina Harbinja, Does the EU Data Protection Regime Protect PostMortem Privacy and What Could Be the Potential Alternatives?, 10 SCRIPT-ED
19, 35–36 (2013).
226. This effect varies, of course, depending on the reputational effects that
the information has on heirs, and it has exceptions, such as genetic information
about hereditary conditions.
227. See Samuelson, supra note 133, at 1141 (“Given the mismatch between
the purposes of personal data protection and of traditional intellectual property
rules, it would be difficult to justify such legislation under . . . copyright and
patent legislation.”).
228. See id.
229. This relates to the objection, also advanced by Samuelson, that
including personal information as intangible property would lead to incoherence
of intellectual property law. See id.
230. See id. at 1129 (stating that “[d]eep differences in the purposes and
mechanisms of traditional intellectual property rights regimes . . . raise serious
doubts about the viability of a property rights approach and about its prospects
of achieving information privacy goals”).
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which rights of the bundle are worth keeping to protect personal
information.231 The next section addresses this question.
D. TREATING DIFFERENT TYPES OF INFORMATION DIFFERENTLY
So far we have seen the reasons to create privacy
entitlements, and the different ways to protect them. An
additional point follows from the information production
argument: that different types of information ought to be
Some
technological
protected
in
different
ways.232
characteristics of information exchanges, which have
consequences for production, provide additional considerations
to improve IPL from an economic perspective. The main
elements for these purposes are three: on the supply side, the
generation of information and its externalities, and on the
demand side, the uses that can be given to it.
On the supply side, to incentivize information production,
we must identify how it is created. Copyright’s property
characteristics attempt to prevent freeriding on the author’s
expression, thereby internalizing the positive spillovers.233 The
same rationale should be applied to IPL, protecting some types
of data more than others.
Concretely, from this perspective, a higher level of
protection is justified for information generated based on the
user’s consent. This is analogous to the economic rationale of
copyright law for protecting expression but not ideas, because (i)
ideas expressed by others is information that had significant
input from someone else, (ii) protection of ideas would be too
wide and would likely compensate creators beyond their costs,
and (iii) this would elevate transaction costs.234 Only
information generated based on the user’s consent fits within
peer-to-peer sharing, where Internet users produce the
information to the degree to which their expected costs are

231. There are additional rights, other than property rights, that may make
it possible to protect personal data. See, e.g., id. at 1146 (“[I]t may be worth
mentioning ‘moral rights’ of authors as a model for a nontraditional property
right that might be adaptable to protecting personal data.”).
232. See, e.g., BJ Ard, Confidentiality and the Problem of Third Parties:
Protecting Reader Privacy in the Age of Intermediaries, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 1
(2013) (detailing a regime to protect reading records).
233. See Landes & Posner, supra note 58.
234. Id.
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compensated.235 Therefore, this type of information should be
given a higher level of protection than the rest to incentivize its
generation.
For example, Google Earth has significant marginal costs of
gathering information—by taking pictures across the globe—
while Google+ and other social networks do not, because they
form part of a system where people surrender information
voluntarily.236 Both products fall roughly under the same
privacy rules,237 but Google Earth’s methods of gathering
information are closer to those that traditional privacy law deals
with.238 To incentivize information generation, users’ privacy
should have a higher level of protection for Google+ than for
Google Earth.
From this perspective, the under-protection of privacy
related to data mining (mentioned as a drawback of the property
rule) could be welfare enhancing.239 Data mining implies costs of
assembly for the data miner, who after such process generates
new information by combining the pieces of information used. If
personal information generated by data mining were granted a
lower level of protection than personal information acquired in
its entirety, IPL would incentivize the generation of new
information via data mining as well. Some level of protection
should still be granted because, even if the data miner added
value, she did not create the information from nothing, but
needed individual pieces of data to construct it.
This leads to the more general question of who owns, under
the property elements of IPL, information that was generated by
someone other than the information’s subject. Under current
IPL, to the extent that it features property characteristics, the
information’s initial owner is the person whom the information
concerns (the Internet user).240 To incentivize information
production, however, some property interests should be granted
235. See discussion infra notes 237–39.
236. Compare GOOGLE EARTH, https://www.google.com/earth/ (last visited
Feb. 8, 2017), with GOOGLE+, https://plus.google.com/ (last visited Feb. 8, 2017).
237. Jurisdictional issues notwithstanding.
238. See Earth Help, GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/earth/answer
/6327779 (last visited Feb. 8, 2017) (explaining how Google Earth images are
collected).
239. See generally Hagel & Rayport, supra note 84.
240. But cf. Prins, supra note 42, at 276 (explaining that on social media
profiles, the social media organization owns the personal information disclosed
on profiles).
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to the information’s creator in scenarios where she is not the
person to whom the information refers. This information-creator
has different production and cost functions than Internet users
who disclose data. For the former, personal information is not a
by-product, and the costs associated with it are unrelated to
expected privacy breaches.241 But, inasmuch as IPL serves to
incentivize information production, the cost of generating such
information should be compensated as well.242 Following the
previous argument, the more the added value of the company to
produce a piece of information, the more IPL could reduce the
level of protection when compared to the situation in which the
user generates the information by herself. It is difficult to
imagine a case in which a company can produce personal
information about a user without any help from her—which
means that some level of protection should always be present.
An analogy can be drawn with the way intellectual property
assigns interests. For instance, rights over photographs are
assigned to the author (the collector of information) as opposed
to the person photographed, and she is entitled to use it without
the consent of the person who was photographed—with some
limitations such as those imposed by the subject’s right to
publicity.243 This rule incentivizes the generation of photographs
(which are one kind of information) because it allocates the
entitlement to the actor who needs to make the larger marginal
investment for the photograph’s creation.244
The second consideration, again from the supply side, is the
cost to Internet users of producing information. To determine the
expected cost that a user would face from disclosing a piece of
information, it becomes relevant again whether it was generated
based on consent. From the point of view of revealed preferences,
information that a user decided not to reveal is more likely to
present a larger expected cost for her than information that she
chose to reveal. There could be, from this perspective, a self-

241. See Hagel & Rayport, supra note 84.
242. This property interest would be relevant, for example, for journalism.
At a more general level, this principle would play a role in maintaining freedom
of expression within IPL.
243. See Prins, supra note 42, at 283 (discussing the arguments surrounding
the right of publicity).
244. See Samuelson, supra note 133, at 1150 (explaining that “publicity law
largely concerns itself with providing appropriate incentives to induce
investments in creative efforts, not to protect personality based interests”).
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selection process where undisclosed data presents higher risks.
Here consent would seem to operate in the opposite direction
than before: the less consent involved, the more protection
needed. However, when personal information is a by-product,
this is not necessarily true: there can be information that an
Internet user did not have incentive to disclose, not because it
has a high expected cost, but because it has a low expected
benefit.245 In the example given before, maybe she does not care
about disclosing her location, but she gets no utility from fitness
applications.
A better indicator than consent to determine the level of
externalities is the type of information disclosed. There are
different levels of privacy risks between sensitive and nonsensitive data, and between online and offline data. We could
presume that the non-disclosure of sensitive data is motivated
by the self-selection process mentioned above and therefore
disclosing is potentially harmful, while the non-disclosure of
non-sensitive data might be due to lack of incentives to
disclose.246 Under this assumption, less consent involved would
mean more privacy protection needed only for sensitive
information.
Both of these elements (consent and type of data), and to
some extent the assumption regarding the differences between
undisclosed sensitive and non-sensitive data, are present in IPL.
In the United States, different statutes provide an increased
level of protection to different kinds of information considered
sensitive, such as the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) for medical data and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act (FCRA) for personal credit information.247
European DPL, gives special protection to sensitive data more

245. Companies combat this low-benefit obstacle by offering incentives to
users that disclose personal information. See Prins, supra note 42, at 277 (“One
example of such a benefit is offered by . . . [the] Google Gmail initiative: it offers
greater storage space in return for having Google monitor email and use the
information for advertising.”)
246. It is not easy to determine which information is sensitive, and which is
not. The United States does not have a general statute that defines sensitive
information. A general approach could consider information that could lead to
discrimination as sensitive. European DPL has an enumeration of types of
information considered sensitive, such as age, race, and gender.
247. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
Pub. L. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996); Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1681 (2012).
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directly through the rule that, unlike other kinds of data, it can
be processed only on the basis of consent.248 Non-disclosed
sensitive data, in this way, has a protection closer to a property
rule, reflecting the different levels of expected externalities.
On the demand side, we should distinguish what use can be
made of the information, because not all types information have
equal social weight. On average, less social gain might be
extracted from information that can be used solely for marketing
(and might represent, individually, a low benefit for the
company) compared to information that can be used for research
regarding public health or the prevention of crime.249
It would be impossible for IPL to assess each unit of
information individually to provide a tailored level of
protection.250 However, a plausible heuristic to approximate the
social value of the information’s use, and the level of
internalization of this value, is whether its use serves a public
good or a private interest.251
This distinction has already been taken into account to a
limited degree by the law. European DPL does so by
incorporating exceptions for freedom of expression,252
research,253 and healthcare,254 where the Internet user has a
lower level of protection.255 The U.S. sectoral approach seems to
attempt this as well, with tailored exceptions and provisions for
its specific statutes, such as HIPAA’s permitted uses and
disclosures of personal without patient consent for treatment

248. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 8(2)(a), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 40–41
(EC).
249. See Prins, supra note 42, at 273 (noting that crime detection is one of
the useful results of our data-based society).
250. Cf. id. at 300 (stating that new technologies may enable the provision
of individually tailored services).
251. See J.H. Reichman & Jonathan A. Franklin, Privately Legislated
Intellectual Property Rights: Reconciling Freedom of Contract with Public Good
Uses of Information, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 875, 882 (1999) (stating that “[w]hile
legislative adoption of our proposed doctrinal safeguards would enable
entrepreneurs to preserve the benefits of Article 2B [of the UCC] . . . it would
discourage them from . . . undermin[ing] essential public good uses of
information”).
252. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 9, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 41 (EC).
253. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 6(1)(b), 6(1)(e), 11(2), 13(2), 32(3), 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31, 40–42, 49–50 (EC).
254. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 8(3), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 41 (EC).
255. Note that the directive defines these exceptions broadly, for countries
to have a broad scope of discretion in their implementations.
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purposes—applicable when a provider needs record access to
ensure quality care.256
The problem with the omnibus approach is that it makes it
more difficult to distinguish between uses and between types of
information. The problem with the sectoral approach is that the
industry-specific statutes protect different channels of data flow,
not different types of information, which map onto the different
private interests, or of uses, which could be used as a proxy for
social value.257 HIPPA, for example, protects health data
collected by doctors and insurers but not by commercial devices,
which continue to become pervasive.258 The Gramm-LeachBliley Act (GLBA) applies only to some financial institutions, as
defined in the same statute.259 The Video Privacy Protection Act
(VPPA) applies only to physical recordings and not to online
video streaming,260 which is arguably more relevant. The Stored
Communications Act (SCA) applies to text messaging but not to
social media postings.261 Still, while these are industry-specific
and not information-specific, there is some correlation between
industry and type of information involved regarding private
interests and uses.
This mixed protection approach is able to justify IPL’s
central elements, and in particular the rights that Internet users
have within it. IPL creates entitlements with a gradient in their
protection: sometimes requiring consent, sometimes requiring
transparency measures such as informing the user of what is
done with the information, and sometimes simply imposing
liability.262
By doing this, IPL provides entitlements that sometimes
allow Internet users to exclude others—both the State and their

256. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(2) (2016) (exchange for treatment); 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.506(c)(4) (exchange for healthcare operations).
257. See Paul Ohm, Sensitive Information, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125, 1189-92
(2015).
258. See Ignacio N. Cofone, A Healthy Amount of Privacy: Quantifying
Privacy Concerns in Medicine, 65 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 3, 23 (2016); Rebecca
Lipman, Online Privacy and the Invisible Market for Our Data, 120 PENN. ST.
L. REV. 777, 788 (2016).
259. See Ohm, supra note 257, at 1190.
260. See id. at 1140.
261. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–12 (2012). See Theodore Rostow, Note, What
Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your Data?: A New Privacy Harm in the
Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2017).
262. Cf. generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 18.
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peers—from accessing and using their personal information, and
sometimes protects them with other levels of magnitude. IPL
does this, for example, by defining the appropriate channel for
information flow even without agency on the side of the user, or
by compensating them in case of harm.263 An example of this
trend of protection without exclusion is the establishment of
data breach notification requirements at state level—and the
attempt to do so at federal level.264 Protections of this kind give
Internet users rights over their personal information sometimes
through differing degrees of exclusion and sometimes through
other strategies.265
VI. CONCLUSION
The way we treat our personal information and the limits of
our privacy changes with new technologies. The Internet, the
biggest agent in this change, has become a zero marginal cost
distribution channel for both voluntary and involuntary
exchanges. It turned from a system of information storage by
some and information retrieval by others to a system where
everyone creates and retrieves content. As a result, incentives to
produce content must be given not solely to companies but also
to users. While personal information can be given costlessly to
others, it is still costly to produce. This implies the existence of
spillovers that potentially lead to a deficit problem with too little
263. Id. The central rights of European DPL, such as the right to know, the
right to access, the right to object, the right to refuse, and the right to be
forgotten, are examples of this idea. See Council Directive 95/46, art. 12, 14,
1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42–43 (EC) (defining the rights to access and object,
respectively). The main EU duties of data controllers, such as the duty to
provide security in processing, the duty to maintain confidentiality of
communications, the duty to specify a limited and justified purpose for
collecting or processing, and the requirement of consent for secondary
processing of data, operate in the same way, and also give differing levels of
exclusion. See Council Directive 2002/58, art. 4, 5, 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 43–44
(EC) (describing the “security” and “confidentiality” requirements, respectively,
of data processors).
264. H.R. 1704, 114th Cong. (2015).
265. In the EU, the right to know and the right to access, for example, merely
reduce information asymmetries, and they do not limit the data controller in
her use of the information. The rights to object and to refuse, on the other hand,
give users a higher level of exclusion: the possibility to stop data collection if
there is no legitimate basis of processing. See Samuelson, supra note 133
(explaining that “[b]ecause individuals generally have a legal right to exclude
other people from access to their private data, they may have a sense that they
have a property right in the data as well as a legal right to restrict access to it”).
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information being produced—a dynamic much like the one
addressed through copyright.
Personal information in the Internet can be characterized
as: (i) a public good, (ii) a good that can be disseminated at a low
cost, and (iii) a good that is not yet available. Because this good
is produced as a by-product of a consumption activity, IPL is not
the only tool that can foster its production; the market can
induce some level of information even in the absence of privacy,
although this level is likely suboptimal. Given the public good
characteristics of information, an optimal level of production can
only be achieved through a regime that internalizes
information’s positive spillovers to its producers. The allocation
of entitlements defines that degree of internalization and IPL,
in such a way, can establish production incentives and foster the
generation of information. Some level of privacy creates
incentives to disclose personal data and generate information,
thereby reducing the deficit problem.
Hence, the interdependence between privacy and access to
information in the context of new technologies is not negative:
privacy and information are often not at a tradeoff. Zero privacy
would lead to a persisting deficit problem and a low level of
information production (dynamic effect of IPL), while absolute
privacy would lead to a high level of information production but
no information flow (static effect of IPL). That information
privacy is not opposed to creating an information society is good
news.
As a result, some level of privacy can induce more
disclosure, meaning more generation of information. More
concretely, the relation between privacy and the amount of
information available forms a hill-shaped concave function,
where either no privacy at all or maximum privacy reduce the
amount of information available. A right to privacy within
information technology is desirable if one wishes to increase
information disclosure.
This leads to the question of how to best protect these
entitlements. Any of the three canonical entitlement protections
by themselves (liability rules, property rules, or inalienability
rules) would undermine the utility of IPL. For liability rules, the
problem arises from a causal uncertainty problem that is
unresolvable with the traditional means used elsewhere. For
property rules, principal-agent relations are the problem. For
inalienability rules, the benefits of information production would
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be offset by a reduction in information flow—at this high level of
protection, privacy and information would have a negative
relationship, as illustrated in Figure 1.266
Recognizing this relationship between privacy and
information flow, an approach that combines the first two rules
would maximize both privacy and access to information for
Internet users. This provides a direction for IPL: an optimal
privacy-protection system should present a mixed protection,
which provides varying scopes of exclusion, higher than liability
rule protection and lower than property rule protection.
Moreover, given the differences between IPL and copyright, the
level of exclusion or propertization for IPL should be lower than
for copyright law. IPL has significant similarities with the
protection for copyrighted works and, where it differs, the
explanation lies in the different incentive structures that arise
due to the characteristics of information under IPL.
Whether to implement exclusion, and what level of
exclusion is desirable, will depend on the type of information.
From an economic perspective, IPL should take into account (i)
who incurred costs to generate the information, (ii) the social
benefits that can derive from the use of such information, and
(iii) the size of the expected externalities of its use for Internet
users given the type of information involved.
In sum, these considerations lead to three conclusions. First,
privacy and access to information are not countervailing rights;
the social costs of lacking privacy include the underproduction of
information. Second, an optimal level of exclusion to incentivize
the production of personal information depends on context and
is generally lower than that provided by property rules, and
lower than that of copyright, but higher than that of liability
rules, and it will depend on the type of data in question. Third,
the optimal level of protection depends on the type of
information involved. An IPL that follows the type of
information can address this concern and would be more
efficient for this purpose than either an omnibus or an industryspecific approach.
By focusing on IPL as a mechanism to promote the
generation of information, moreover, the approach introduced
with this article closes two gaps in the privacy literature. First,
the question of why privacy is relevant is answered by seeing
266. See supra Part III.
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that the placement of its entitlement matters for production and
that transaction costs are not low. Second, the question of how
property elements over personal information can be justified in
the face of the alleged mismatch between the reasons to protect
personal information and to protect intellectual property 267 is
addressed by showing that both copyright and IPL foster the
generation of information.

267. Samuelson, supra note 133.

